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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review enables constitutional courts to test primary legislation for 
compliance with fundamental rights.  The form in which judicial review 
manifests itself has been a subject of widespread academic scholarship for 
decades.1  In recent years, this has been coupled with a proliferation of 
literature on political responses to judicial review.2  Scholars have begun to 
ask whether, when, and how governments and legislatures should respond to 
judgments holding legislation unconstitutional.  
This Article seeks to contribute to the scholarship in this upcoming sphere 
of political responses to judicial review.  The focus will be on two 
jurisdictions, which lie on opposite ends of the “strong form-weak form” 
spectrum of judicial review––India and the United Kingdom.  Indian courts, 
like their United States counterparts,3 have the power to “strike down” any 
legislation that fails to comply with constitutional rights—a strong form 
power of judicial review which many perceive to place courts in the driving 
seat of constitutional politics.  However, under the U.K. Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), courts can only make a non-binding declaration of 
incompatibility when legislation passed by Parliament is incompliant with 
the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).4  
This form of review is commonly considered weak, since it permits 
Westminster Parliament to decide what, if anything, to do about the 
incompatibility.  Although there are vibrant streams of constitutional 
scholarship in both jurisdictions, no recent academic work has explicitly 
compared political responses to judicial review in India and the U.K.  
                                                                                                                   
 1 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986); MARK 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Jeremy Waldron, The 
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The Core of An Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008).  
 2 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS (2008); ARUNA SATHANAPALLY, 
BEYOND DISAGREEMENT: OPEN REMEDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (2012); Christine 
Bateup, Reassessing the Dialogic Possibilities of Weak-Form Bills of Rights, 32 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 529 (2009); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 257 (2005). 
 3 Note, however, that judicial review is far more decentralized in the United States.  
Leaving aside some administrative tribunals, only the Supreme Court and High Courts can 
strike down legislation in India.  In the U.S., “any judge of any court, in any case, or at any 
time, at the behest of any litigating party” can strike down a law (Martin J. Shapiro & Alec 
Stone Sweet, The New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 397 (1994)). 
 4 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3–4 (U.K.). 
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Throughout this Article, “declarations of unconstitutionality” will be 
employed as a jurisdiction-neutral expression to encompass two distinct 
constitutional remedies: the power to strike down legislation in India and to 
make declarations of incompatibility in the U.K.  It is worth acknowledging 
that these remedies have different effects: one leads to the immediate 
disapplication of the statute while the other has no automatic legal 
consequence.5  Having said that, in both India and the U.K., courts are 
empowered to find legislation unconstitutional, notwithstanding that the 
consequences of such findings vary.  Courts in both jurisdictions perceive 
this as an accurate depiction of the judiciary’s role.6  
Certain points of contrast in the constitutional systems of India and the 
U.K. make a comparison between the two interesting.  The power to strike 
down legislation that is inconsistent with India’s Constitution of 1949 is 
considered an exposition of strong form “U.S.-style” judicial review.  The 
constitutional context to this power is supplied by the increasing influence 
and legitimacy of Indian courts in recent decades, prompting scholars to 
christen India as a “juristocracy”7 or a state characterized by judicial 
sovereignty8 or supremacy,9 and even “judicial dictatorship.”10  On the other 
hand, declarations of incompatibility under the HRA, which were 
intentionally kept advisory in effect, are considered an exemplar of weak 
form judicial review.  The HRA forms a cornerstone of U.K.’s multi-
layered11 uncodified12 constitutional system and is ascribed different labels––
                                                                                                                   
 5 Nicholas Bamforth and Mark Eliott usefully put to me that “declarations of 
unconstitutionality” may not be an appropriate expression, given the different nature of the 
two constitutional remedies in India and the U.K.  However, the expression focuses on the 
finding of unconstitutionality in both jurisdictions, regardless of their effects on legislation.  
 6 For example, in R (Chester) v. Secretary of State, [2013] UKSC 63 [90], Baroness Hale 
observed that it was the U.K. Supreme Court’s task under the HRA to declare discriminatory 
legislation unconstitutional.  See also Philips Electronics India Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, 
(2009) 20 S.T.T. 314, 42–43 (India); Gov’t of Andhra Pradesh v. Laxmi Devi, A.I.R. 2008 
S.C. 1640, 33 (India); T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724, 14 
(India); In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 332, 250 (India). 
 7 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lecture at Brown University, On the Construction of Judicial 
Authority: Courts and Public Reason in India (Oct. 5, 2009); Sanjay Ruparelia, A Progressive 
Juristocracy? The Unexpected Social Activism of India’s Supreme Court 33 (Helen Kellogg 
Institute for International Studies, Working Paper No. 391, 2013).  
 8 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 70 (2007). 
 9 Raju Ramachandran, Judicial Supremacy and the Collegium, 642 SEMINAR 64 (2013). 
 10 Arundhati Roy, Scandal in the Palace, OUTLOOK INDIA (Oct. 1, 2007). 
 11 Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland, Introduction to PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED 
CONSTITUTION 1 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., 2003). 
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among them, the “new commonwealth model of constitutionalism,”13 the 
“third wave bill of rights,”14 the “democratic dialogue” model15 and the 
“parliamentary bill of rights”16 model.  Parliamentary sovereignty, which has 
long remained one of the main planks of British constitutional discourse, 
continues to raise its head in discussions on the HRA in general, and section 
4 in particular.17  These two dichotomies, strong form review versus weak 
form review and judicial supremacy versus parliamentary sovereignty, 
provide a fascinating canvass for comparisons of political responses to 
declarations of unconstitutionality.  The findings of this article tend to call 
into question, or at least undermine the force of, these dichotomies.  
The notion of the space available for political responses to declarations of 
unconstitutionality is the dominant theme of this Article.  “Space” is an open 
textured term susceptible to a range of different meanings.  With the 
objective of sustaining a consistent focus, it will be ascribed two distinct 
connotations.  The first connotation of “space,” which will be referred to as 
decisional space, asks the “whether” question––can political actors in both 
jurisdictions respond to declarations of unconstitutionality to begin with?  
The second connotation, remedial space, asks the “how” question––what are 
the different ways in which political actors can respond to declarations of 
unconstitutionality?  
With this background, the Article will proceed as follows.  Part II lays the 
foundation by briefly examining the toolkit of constitutional remedies 
available to Indian and U.K. courts when they find that primary legislation 
contravenes fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution and 
Convention rights respectively.  Part III focuses on two mechanisms through 
which the Parliament of India has responded to declarations of 
unconstitutionality: fundamental rights amendments and Ninth Schedule 
                                                                                                                   
 12 “Uncodified” is deliberately used instead of the word “unwritten,” since it better conveys 
the idea that the constitution, though written in several different places, is not written in any 
single canonical text.  
 13 STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013). 
 14 Francesca Klug, The Human Rights Act – a “Third Way” or “Third Wave” Bill of Rights, 
4 EURO. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 361 (2001). 
 15 ALISON YOUNG, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, at chs. 4–5 
(2009). 
 16 Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: An Alternative Model?, 69 MOD. L. REV. 
7 (2006). 
 17 Nicholas Bamforth, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998, [1998] 
P.L. 572; YOUNG, supra note 15; N.W. Barber, The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 9 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 144 (2011). 
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amendments.  Part IV briefly studies declarations of unconstitutionality in 
the U.K., before determining the space available to Parliament and 
government for responding to such declarations.  Part V brings together the 
two preceding sections by analytically comparing the space for political 
actors to respond to declarations of unconstitutionality in India and the U.K.  
Concluding comments are made in the final section. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES IN INDIA AND THE U.K. 
A comparison of the space available for political responses to declarations 
of unconstitutionality in India and the U.K. cannot be meaningful without 
situating such declarations in their constitutional context.  This Part seeks to 
supply that context by examining the toolkit of constitutional remedies 
available to courts in India and the U.K. for legislative transgressions of the 
fundamental rights embodied in Part III of the Indian Constitution and 
Convention rights respectively.  
A.  India 
This Part will focus on the judicial remedies available to Indian courts 
dealing with primary legislation that contravenes fundamental rights.  Of 
course, addressing fundamental-rights-violating primary legislation is not 
within the exclusive domain of courts.  Other forms of recourse (for 
example, the ballot box in a representative democracy18 or the pressure of 
public opinion) may perform a similar task.  Since this Article compares 
political responses to judicial declarations of unconstitutionality in India and 
the U.K., the discussion that follows will focus on the tools and remedial 
measures available to Indian courts when deciding constitutional challenges 
to primary legislation.19 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Shripati mentions that the right to vote has been used by citizens on at least one notable 
occasion to defeat the incumbent government accused of committing widespread human rights 
violations.  Vijayashri Sripati, Toward Fifty Years of Constitutionalism and Fundamental 
Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead (1950–2000), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 413, 452 
(1998).  Some of these human rights violations were committed through the powers conferred 
by the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, which was repealed after the national 
elections in 1977.  
 19 This Part will eschew discussions of what Basu describes as “self-imposed limits” on 
judicial review of legislation, such as the rules of standing and stare decisis.  DURGA DAS 
BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 758 (8th ed. 2007).  Basu considers the 
presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislation as a self-imposed limit on judicial 
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1. The Presumption of Constitutionality and Its Impact on Statutory 
Interpretation  
As a starting point when deciding cases involving a constitutional 
challenge to legislation, courts presume that the impugned statute is 
constitutionally valid.  This presumption takes different forms.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly recognized that it must presume that the legislature, on 
account of its institutional position, understands and appreciates the needs of 
its people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by 
experience, and that even its discriminations and classifications are based on 
adequate grounds.20  In order to avoid a “doctrinaire approach” which might 
“choke all beneficial legislation,”21 courts have placed the burden of showing 
that there has been a clear transgression of fundamental rights on the litigant 
that challenges the statute.22  The court can consider matters of common 
knowledge, common report, and socio-political context in order to sustain 
the presumption of constitutionality.23  It may also assume every state of 
facts that can be considered to exist at the time of enactment of the statute.24  
The presumption of constitutionality holds greater influence in the review of 
economic and social legislation as against statutes affecting civil liberties.25  
According to the Supreme Court of India, there is much to learn from the 
Lochner era26 in the U.S., and courts should be slow to interfere with 
legislative decisions of economic policy.27  
The presumption of constitutionality also influences the interpretation of 
legislation under constitutional challenge.  Where multiple interpretations of 
a statute are possible, courts have the functional flexibility to adopt the 
interpretation that complies with the constitutional mandate.28  Where 
                                                                                                                   
review of legislation.  Being centrally relevant to the discussion, this issue will be considered 
in the Part nonetheless. 
 20 See, e.g., State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 490 (India); Municipal 
Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Usmanbhai, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1205 (India). 
 21 Harman Singh v. Reg’l Transp. Auth., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 190 (India). 
 22 Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41 (India). 
 23 Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 358 (India). 
 24 Id.  
 25 Gov’t of Andhra Pradesh v. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 S.C.C. 720  ¶¶ 73, 88 (India). 
 26 See generally MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY (2001). 
 27 Gov’t of Andhra Pradesh v. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 S.C.C. 720.  See also P.N. Tiwari v. 
Union of India, [2004] 265 I.T.R. 224 (All.). 
 28 Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admin., A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675; Bhanu Athaiya v. Commander 
Kaushal, 1980 (82) Bom. L.R. 12, 10 (India); Chettiar v. Narsimhalu, A.I.R. 1980 Mad. 305, 
10 (India); Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1149, 9 (India). 
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statutory language is capable of being read and interpreted restrictively or 
expansively so as to make it fall within constitutional limits, it should be so 
interpreted.29  
The extent to which courts would be willing to stretch their interpretative 
powers in order to save statutes is not clear.  In a frequently cited passage, 
the Supreme Court observed that where a statutory provision cannot be saved 
because its plain meaning is clear, courts should not hesitate to declare it 
unconstitutional.30  Courts cannot protect legislation from constitutional 
challenge by twisting or distorting statutory language.31  However, on other 
occasions, it has been held that an interpretive option that saves the statute 
from unconstitutionality may be preferred even if it requires straining the 
language of the statute.32  
Thus, what is clear from the case law is that when two plausible 
interpretations of a statutory provision exist, the court may adopt the 
interpretation that protects the provision from unconstitutionality.  It is also 
fairly clear that courts cannot protect a statutory provision from invalidation 
by construing it in a manner that is simply not justified by its plain meaning.  
Whether the court can strain (but not distort) statutory language bearing in 
mind the same objective is contentious.  More importantly, where the 
dividing line between a “strain” and a “distortion” of language lies remains 
unanswered, and is left to the circumstances of each case.  
The presumption of constitutionality can be rebutted with prima facie 
evidence that a statutory provision transgresses fundamental rights.33  It is 
then left to the state to establish that the provision falls within constitutional 
limits.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has on some occasions leaned in favor 
of negating the presumption of constitutionality and employing the “strict 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, (1962) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 769, 26–27 (India); Comm’r of Sales 
Tax v. Radhakrishnan, (1979) 2 S.C.C. 249, 15 (India); B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1867, 87 (India); Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 S.C.C. 380, 
24 (India). 
 30 Calcutta Gujarati Educ. Soc’y v. Calcutta Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 4278, 35 (India) 
(citing B.R. Enters. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1867, 87 (India)); Union of 
India v. Ind-Swift Labs., (2011) 2 S.C.R. 1087, 18 (India). 
 31 Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 S.C.C. 745 (India) is a notable exception.  In this 
case, the Supreme Court distorted the language of Sections 12(6) and 15(6) of the Right to 
Information Act (2005) under the guise of “reading down” these provisions.  See A.G. Noorani, 
Judiciary’s Assault on Democracy, THE HINDU, Jan. 12, 2013, available at http://www.thehindu. 
com/opinion/lead/judiciarys-assault-on-democracy/article4299042.ece.  The Supreme Court has 
admitted a petition seeking a review of this judgment. 
 32 State of Kerala v. M.K. Krishnan Nair, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 747 (India). 
 33 Saghir Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 728, 27 (India). 
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scrutiny” standard to test the validity of legislation, although the 
circumstances in which this may be done are contested.34  
2.  The Power to Make Declarations of Unconstitutionality 
It is beyond question that the Supreme Court and High Courts in India 
have the power to declare primary legislation unconstitutional.35  There are 
four established grounds based on which primary legislation passed by 
Parliament or the state legislatures can be struck down or declared 
unconstitutional.36  First, the legislature may not have had the power to enact 
the impugned statute, given the scheme of distribution of legislative powers 
between the Union and the states.37  Second, the statute might be found to 
breach one or more fundamental rights embodied in Part III of the 
Constitution.38  Third, the statute may contravene any other justiciable 
provision of the Constitution.39  Fourth, the statute may be invalidated for 
having delegated an essential legislative function to the executive or another 
authority.40  Since this part examines constitutional remedies available vis-à-
                                                                                                                   
 34 Raag Yadava, Taking Rights Seriously – The Supreme Court on Strict Scrutiny, 22 NAT’L 
L. SCH. INDIA REV. 147 (2010). 
 35 However, the textual basis of the power to declare legislation unconstitutional is heavily 
contested.  See Chintan Chandrachud, Strike-Downs in India and Declarations of Incompatibility 
in the U.K.: Comparing the Space for Political Response (2013) (thesis submitted to the Faculty 
of Law, University of Oxford).  
 36 BASU, supra note 19, at 697.  When a court declares legislation unconstitutional, its 
decision is legally binding and usually takes immediate effect.  This results in the 
disapplication of the unconstitutional statute.  
 37 The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India contains three lists outlining the 
distribution of legislative powers: the Union List (which includes matters on which Parliament 
has the exclusive power to legislate), the State List (which includes matters on which state 
legislatures have the exclusive power to legislate, except in certain circumstances) and the 
Concurrent List (which includes matters on which both Parliament and the state legislatures 
have the power to legislate). 
 38 See, e.g., R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564 (India). 
 39 See, e.g., Atiabari Tea v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 232 (India); Sarbananda 
Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 S.C.C. 665 (India).  Part IV of the Constitution of India 
contains the Directive Principles of State Policy which, according to Article 37, are not 
enforceable in any court but are “nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country.”  
Several Directive Principles have been indirectly enforced by being read into one or more 
fundamental rights under Part III.  
 40 See, e.g., In re Delhi Laws Act (1912), A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 332 (India).  However, 
invalidation of a statute for excessive delegation is inextricably linked to a breach of the 
fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.  Trustees for the 
Improvement of Calcutta v. Chandra Sekhar, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2034, 7 (India). 
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vis legislation that transgresses fundamental rights, the power to declare 
legislation unconstitutional on this ground alone will be considered.  
3.  The Relationship Between Statutory Interpretation and Declarations 
of Unconstitutionality 
The nature of the relationship between the power to declare legislation 
unconstitutional and the interpretation of statutes has not been analyzed in 
sufficient detail in the existing scholarship and case law.  As stated 
previously, when presented with two plausible interpretations of a statutory 
provision, the presumption of constitutionality makes the court lean in favor 
of the interpretation that preserves the provision.  Problems begin to arise 
when the language of the provision does not comfortably permit an 
interpretation that complies with constitutional requirements.  In such cases, 
it is left to the court to decide the extent to which it can permissibly interpret 
the statutory language at issue.  However, where the statutory provision 
clearly breaches a fundamental right, courts will not be hesitant to declare it 
unconstitutional.  
B.  The U.K. 
The HRA gave some rights in the Convention a special legal effect, with 
the aspiration of transforming them from rights available to British citizens 
to “British rights.”41  The objective of the HRA is to give further effect to the 
rights and freedoms embodied in Articles 2 through 12 and 14 of the 
Convention as well as Articles 1 through 3 of the First Protocol and Article 1 
of the Thirteenth Protocol.  Section 19 of the HRA provides for a pre-
emptive measure to politically deter the enactment of legislation 
transgressing Convention rights.  This section requires a Minister of the 
Crown to make a statement before the second reading of a bill to the effect 
that in his view, the provisions of the bill are compatible with the Convention 
rights, or that although he is unable to make a statement of compatibility, the 
government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the bill.  This 
part seeks to describe and contextualize the remedial framework of the HRA 
with regard to breaches (or potential breaches) of Convention rights by 
enacted primary legislation. 
                                                                                                                   
 41 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, 1997, C.M. Bill 3782, cl. 1.14 (Gr. Brit.).  
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1.  The Interpretive Power under Section 3 
Section 3 of the HRA directs courts to read and give effect to primary and 
subordinate legislation in a manner compatible with Convention rights, “so 
far as it is possible to do so.”42  It applies to legislation passed before and 
after the enforcement of the HRA.43  Section 3 enhanced the influence of 
Convention rights in the process of interpretation.  Rather than simply having 
to take them into account while interpreting ambiguous legislative 
provisions, courts would be required to interpret legislation so as to uphold 
Convention rights unless the legislation was so clearly incompatible that it 
would be impossible to do so.44  
One of the most controversial aspects of the HRA is how Section 3 
should itself be interpreted.  Although most theorists agree that Section 3 
involved a shift in the existing landscape of interpretation,45 the full scope of 
the shift remains unclear.  What does “so far as it is possible to do so” mean?  
Political and legislative history confirms that the word “possible” was not 
intended to be read as “reasonable.”  An amendment, proposed by the 
opposition party, that courts should construe legislation in accordance with 
Convention rights so far as it was “reasonable” to do so was defeated, since 
the Labour government at the time wished for the declaration of 
unconstitutionality under Section 446 to be a remedy of last resort.47 
In the early years of the HRA, Oliver argued that on a proper 
understanding Section 3 marked a shift in the focus of courts from upholding 
parliamentary intention to interpreting legislation in a Convention compliant 
manner, even if doing so was artificial and went beyond the intent of 
                                                                                                                   
 42 However, settled case law indicates that Section 3 of the HRA comes into play only 
when the ordinary rules of interpretation, applied without reference to Section 3, render a 
statutory provision incompatible with Convention rights.  Poplar Hous. and Regeneration v. 
Donoghue, 415 [2001] EWCA (Civ) 595. 
 43 Section 3(2)(a) specifies that Section 3 of the HRA “applies to primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation whenever enacted.” 
 44 Rights Brought Home, supra note 41, at cl. 2.7. 
 45 Geoffrey Marshall, Interpreting interpretation in the Human Rights Bill, (1998) P.L. 167; 
Lord Steyn, Incorporation and Devolution - A Few Reflections on the Changing Scene, (1998) 
E.H.R.L.R. 153; AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 19 (2009). 
 46 Section 4(2) of the HRA reads: “If the court is satisfied that the provision [of primary 
legislation] is incompatible with a Convention right, it may make a declaration of that 
incompatibility.” 
 47 313 PARL. DEB., H.C. (1998) 421–422 (U.K.). 
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lawmakers.48  This argument requires qualification.  As Kavanagh points out, 
there are two intentions at play in Section 3 cases: the intention of Parliament 
in enacting the impugned statute and the intention of Parliament in enacting 
Section 3 of the HRA.49  Thus the shift in focus, if at all, is in the selection of 
the second intention over the first.  Others also highlight that Section 3 is 
aimed at identifying the intention of Parliament with the rebuttable 
presumption that the legislature does not intend to breach Convention rights, 
given the “new constitutional setting” created by that provision.50  According 
to Samuels, the judge must search for a “legitimate, justified, reasonable, and 
proportionate interpretation,” based on a broad rather than narrow legalistic 
approach.51 
Courts have both “read down”52 and read additional words53 into 
legislation in order to save it from transgressing Convention rights.54  As 
Lord Steyn observed in R. v. A. (No 2),55 Section 3 permitted courts to strain 
statutory language, read down express language, and implicate provisions to 
promote compliance with Convention rights.  However, courts cannot depart 
from a fundamental feature of a statute56 or radically alter its effect57 as this 
breaches the boundary between interpretation and amendment.  Nor can 
courts, through an act of “judicial vandalism,” squarely contradict 
parliamentary intent.58  In the House of Lords’ seminal judgment in Ghaidan 
v. Godin-Mendoza,59 it was emphasized by the majority, however, that the 
limits of the application of Section 3 extend up to the conceptual scheme of 
the legislation rather than the precise language used by parliamentary 
                                                                                                                   
 48 DAWN OLIVER, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UK 114 (2003). 
 49 Aileen Kavanagh, Unlocking the Human Rights Act: The “Radical” Approach to Section 
3(1) Revisited, [2005] E.H.R.L.R. 259, 269. 
 50 Philip Sales & Richard Ekins, Rights-consistent Interpretation and the Human Rights Act 
1998, 127 L.Q.R. 217, 221 (Apr. 2011). 
 51 Alec Samuels, Human Rights Act 1998 Section 3: A New Dimension to Statutory 
Interpretation?, 29(2) S.L.R. 130, 135 (2008). 
 52 R. v. Keogh, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 528. 
 53 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 54 OLIVER, supra note 48, at 114. 
 55 [2002] 1 A.C. 45. 
 56 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (appeal taken from 
Eng.); In re S, [2002] 2 A.C. 291 (H.L.). 
 57 Poplar Hous. & Regeneration v. Donoghue, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 595 [76] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 58 R (Anderson) v. S.S.H.D., [2003] 1 A.C. 837 (H.L.). 
 59 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
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draftsmen to give effect to that scheme.60  Moreover, courts are not required 
to make decisions for which they are not institutionally equipped.61  
What is discernible from the case law is that courts remain sensitive to 
context when determining the extent to which they are willing to mold 
statutory language and purpose.62  This was made clear by Lord Hoffman’s 
observation in Wilkinson that Section 3 was not intended to “have the effect 
of requiring the courts to give the language of statutes acontextual 
meanings.”63  Thus, developing a self-standing test independent of context 
would probably be a futile exercise.64 
2.  Declarations of Unconstitutionality: HRA Section 4 
Section 4 of the HRA empowers courts65 to issue a “declaration of 
incompatibility” (or a declaration of unconstitutionality, as I refer to it) when 
legislation66 that cannot be interpreted in a Convention-compliant manner is 
inconsistent with a Convention right.67  A declaration under Section 4 does 
not automatically result in the disapplication of the statute, but represents an 
important political and moral sanction.68  According to the House of Lords, a 
declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be issued in abstraction or in the 
absence of victims whose rights have been compromised.69  
                                                                                                                   
 60 KAVANAGH, supra note 45, at 52. 
 61 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 62 Roger Masterman, Interpretations, Declarations and Dialogue: Rights Protection Under 
the Human Rights Act and Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities, [2009] 
P.L. 112. 
 63 R (Wilkinson) v. Inland Revenue Commr’s, [2005] UKHL 304 [17] (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 64 T.R.S. Allan, Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights 
Act in Constitutional Perspective, 59 CLP 27 (2006). 
 65 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(5) (U.K.).  Section 4(5) of the HRA specifies that 
only the following courts may issue declarations of unconstitutionality: the Supreme Court; 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; the Court Martial Appeal Court; the High Court 
of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court or the Court of Session (Scotland); the High 
Court or the Court of Appeal (England and Wales or Northern Ireland); the Court of 
Protection, in any matter being dealt with by the President of the Family Division, the Vice-
Chancellor or a puisne judge of the High Court. 
 66 Id. § 4(1), (3).  This encompasses primary legislation and subordinate legislation made in 
exercise of a power conferred by primary legislation, where such primary legislation prevents 
removal of the incompatibility.  This section focuses on primary legislation. 
 67 Id. § 4(2)–(3). 
 68 Id. § 4(6). 
 69 R (Rusbridger) v. AG, [2004] 1 A.C. 357 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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The invocation of Section 4 statutorily activates a ministerial power to 
take fast-track remedial action.70  Under Section 10 of the HRA, a Minister 
of the Crown may, if he finds compelling reasons to do so, make 
amendments to legislation as he considers necessary to remove an identified 
constitutional incompatibility.71  Unless such an order is declared urgent, a 
remedial order can only be made when a draft of the order has been approved 
by a resolution of each House of Parliament.72 
Declarations of unconstitutionality have been made in a diverse range of 
matters that include challenges to legislation that criminalized “attempted 
buggery” in Northern Ireland,73 the statutory penalty regime for carriers who 
unknowingly transported clandestine entrants into the U.K.,74 and the 
statutory detention of suspected international terrorists without charge or 
trial.75 
There is a key difference between the judicial tools available under 
Section 3 and Section 4 of the HRA.  Whereas a Section 3 Convention 
compliant interpretation operates retrospectively vis-à-vis the litigant and 
benefits her directly, a Section 4 declaration of unconstitutionality is not 
binding on the parties to the proceeding and “does not affect the validity, 
continuing operation, or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it 
is given.”76  But, it would be misleading to say that a litigant secures no 
benefit (whether political, legal, or otherwise) from a declaration of 
unconstitutionality.  For instance, the government’s ensuing remedial 
measure may be applied retrospectively.77  A narrower point is being made 
here: a declaration of unconstitutionality does not give rise to an automatic 
legal benefit for the litigant and has no immediate effect on her legal rights.78  
In this context, it is easy to understand the reason for which most litigants 
seek Section 3 remedies in preference to declarations of unconstitutionality.  
                                                                                                                   
 70 See id. § 10(1). 
 71 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 10(2) (U.K.). 
 72 Id. at sched. 2.  
 73 In re Application by McR for Jud. Rev., [2002] NIQB 58 (N. Ir.). 
 74 Int’l Transp. Roth v. Sec’y of State, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 158, [2003] Q.B. 728. 
 75 A v. Sec’y of State, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 76 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(6) (U.K.).  
 77 See, for example, the remedial measures following the declarations of incompatibility 
issued in Blood and Tarbuck v. Sec’y of State for Health (unreported) and R (Clift) v. S.S.H.D., 
[2006] UKHL 54, [2007] 1 A.C. 484 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 78 T.R.S. Allan, Questions of Legality and Legitimacy: Form and Substance in British 
Constitutionalism, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 155 (2011). 
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This difference also plays an important role in the courts’ decisions about 
which remedial measure to invoke.79  
3.  The Relationship Between Sections 3 and 4 
The scope of Section 4 necessarily depends upon the breadth of Section 3.  
The broader and more pervasive the courts’ power under Section 3, the 
narrower the room for their making declarations of unconstitutionality.  
Intuitively, Section 4 of the HRA seems to project the stronger judicial role 
in cases involving violations of Convention rights.  However, this is 
misleading: the Section 3 power, if boldly construed, pushes the boundaries 
between interpretation and legislation.80  The most that a court can do under 
Section 4 is to flag up the unconstitutionality, leaving it to the realm of 
political morality for it to be acted upon. 
Loveland suggests that if Section 3 was to be construed as authorizing 
courts to interpret a statutory provision more expansively than its reasonable 
range of meanings would allow, then Section 4 would only become relevant 
vis-à-vis statutory provisions that are expressly intended to derogate from 
Convention rights.81  According to this argument, Section 4 would be otiose 
as regards legislation passed before the HRA came into being.  On the other 
hand, if Section 3 were to be interpreted as permitting the court to draw 
rights-compliant presumptions in gathering legislative intent, the boundary 
between Sections 3 and 4 would change.82  So interpreted, the Section 4 
power may be invoked when the scheme of the statute indicates legislative 
intent to defeat the presumption of rights-compliance and thus breach 
Convention rights.  
Many others do not adopt the view that a statute or statutory provision 
needs to expressly override Convention rights in order for courts to invoke 
Section 4 instead of Section 3.  Allan’s view is that although Section 3 would 
be applicable in a “great majority of cases,” when the raison d’être of the 
statutory provision violates the Convention, a declaration of 
unconstitutionality would be the apposite judicial response.83  Theorists such 
                                                                                                                   
 79 KAVANAGH, supra note 45, at 238. 
 80 See HELEN FENWICK & RICHARD GLANCEY, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 173 (4th 
ed. 2007); Aileen Kavanagh, The Elusive Divide Between Interpretation and Legislation 
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, 24 O.J.L.S. 259 (2004). 
 81 IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 640 
(6th ed. 2012). 
 82 Sales & Ekins, supra note 50. 
 83 Allan, supra note 64, at 41. 
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as Klug84 and Nicol85 advocate a broader role for declarations of 
unconstitutionality––one that promotes a healthy institutional dialogue rather 
than transform Section 4 into a leash on government. Kavanagh points out 
that it is unhelpful to pick sides between those who suggest that Section 4 
should be employed as a remedy of last resort and others who argue that 
courts should be less hesitant in deploying Section 4 declarations.86  A more 
meaningful inquiry would be to explore the factors that do or should 
influence the court’s decision about which remedy to employ.  These factors 
should include: which remedial course would better protect Convention 
Rights, whether the impugned statutory provision goes against the grain of 
the legislation, to what extent a Section 3 interpretation preserves legislative 
objectives, and whether legislative reform is imminent.87 
4.  The Three Stage Process of Review 
The discussion above sheds light on the similarities between Section 3 
interpretation in the U.K. and the interpretation of statutes under 
constitutional challenge in India.  In both jurisdictions, the starting point of 
analysis is the presumption that both parliaments intended to legislate in 
compliance with human rights. But, the analysis of the two countries then 
diverges. Indian courts are highly unlikely to resort to “reading in” by adding 
words to legislation.88  As stated earlier, there are two kinds of intent at play 
here.89  The first is the U.K. Parliament’s intent in enacting Sections 3 and 4 
of the HRA, and the Constituent Assembly of India’s intent in conferring 
constitutional courts in India with the power to review legislation 
(constitutional intent).  The second is the U.K. and Indian Parliaments’ intent 
in enacting the impugned statute (statutory intent).  Courts perceive an 
important difference between “reading down” and “reading in” legislation.  
With respect to the former, courts view their role as effectuating statutory 
                                                                                                                   
 84 Francesca Klug, Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act 1998, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 
125 (2003). 
 85 Danny Nicol, Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson, [2004] P.L. 274. 
 86 KAVANAGH, supra note 45, at 123. 
 87 Id. at 126, 142. 
 88 Union of India v. Deoki Aggarwal, (1992) Supp. (1) S.C.C. 323, 14 (India); B.R. Kapur 
v. State of Tamil Nadu & AMr, (2001) 7 S.C.C. 231, 39 (India); Calcutta Gujarati Educ. Soc’y 
v. Calcutta Mun. Corp., A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 4278, 35 (India); Union of India v. Ind-Swift Labs., 
[2011] 2 S.C.R. 1087, 18 (India); Tata Motors v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 3 Cal. L.T. 1 
(H.C.) [584].  
 89 Kavanagh, supra note 49. 
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intent to the extent that it complies with constitutional intent.90  In the latter, 
courts consider that they do something that extends beyond statutory intent, 
in order to preserve constitutional intent.91  This could mean one of two 
things: when the court seeks to invoke “reading in” to broaden the 
application of a statute, either the legislature had applied its mind to the 
expansive application of a statute and decided not to do so, or it had not 
applied its mind to it at all.  The overall effect of “reading in” and “reading 
down” does not appear to be very different.  In both cases, constitutional 
intent is preserved and statutory intent is preserved to the greatest extent 
possible.  But on the face of it, “reading in” words seems more radical as it 
involves extending statutory intent to undesired or unexpected areas, whereas 
“reading down” language involves limiting statutory intent to some desired 
and expected areas.  This is one of the reasons why Indian courts are 
reluctant to read words into legislation in the absence of Section 3-type 
constitutional intent. 
Courts in India and the U.K. adopt a three-staged approach in cases where 
the conformity of primary legislation with fundamental rights is in question.  
To begin with, they ask whether, according to ordinary principles of 
interpretation, the statute complies with fundamental rights or Convention 
rights.  If it does, the enquiry would end here in both jurisdictions.  If it does 
not, then courts would turn to interpretative techniques (such as “reading 
down,” and in the U.K., “reading in”) to protect the statute from 
transgressing fundamental rights or Convention rights.  Finally, if 
interpretative techniques cannot be used to protect the statute, then the 
impugned statutory provisions would be declared unconstitutional.92  
The critical difference between both jurisdictions in this three-stage 
process of review is the point at which courts proceed from the second stage 
to the third.  The declaration of unconstitutionality is triggered earlier in 
India than in the U.K.  Unlike courts in the U.K., Indian courts would not be 
hesitant to pronounce legislation unconstitutional when its plain meaning 
                                                                                                                   
 90 For the difference between “reading down” and “reading in,” see Richard Edwards, 
Reading Down Legislation under the Human Rights Act, 20 L.S. 353, 367 (2000). 
 91 As Hogg posits, “reading in” involves the insertion “of words that Parliament never 
enacted” and is therefore “a technique of judicial amendment.”  PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF CANADA (5th ed. 2007). 
 92 Elsewhere, I have argued that at the cusp of stages two and three, Indian courts 
sometimes step back to stage one in order to avoid exercising the power to strike down 
legislation.  Chintan Chandrachud, Constitutional Adjudication in the Shadow of the Remedy: 
the Indian Constitution and the U.K. Human Rights Act Compared, Lecture at the Harvard 
Law School (Oct. 7, 2014). 
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contravenes constitutional rights.93  Case law suggests that this would not be 
enough in the U.K.; in fact, courts would be willing to derogate from the 
plain meaning of legislation so long as their interpretation does not disturb 
the fundamental features or conceptual scheme of the statute.94  Further, 
judges have a wide variety of interpretive tools available to them in the U.K., 
some of which Indian judges would consciously avoid (reading words into a 
statute, for instance).  
Judicial review of legislation is firmly entrenched under the Indian 
Constitution.  In the U.K., it is grounded in Sections 3 and 4 of the HRA, 
although the interaction between those provisions is a subject of continuing 
academic and judicial discourse.  Whereas both jurisdictions review 
legislation in three stages, case law suggests that the third stage in India is 
triggered sooner than in the U.K., inter alia on account of a larger range of 
interpretive tools and a keener willingness to depart from statutory language 
in the U.K. 
III.  INDIA: POLITICAL RESPONSES TO DECLARATIONS OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
As stated in Part I, the Supreme Court and High Courts in India have the 
power to declare primary legislation unconstitutional.  No special form of 
proceeding is necessary to enable primary legislation to be declared 
unconstitutional.  Judicial review is fairly centralized—courts subordinate to 
the Supreme Court and High Courts cannot decide questions involving the 
constitutional validity of statutes.95  There is a parallel to be drawn with the 
U.K.: Section 4(5) of the HRA stipulates that only certain courts in the 
judicial hierarchy may issue declarations of unconstitutionality.96  
In the early years of constitutional experience, state and central legislation 
were frequently challenged before the Indian Supreme Court.  Between 
January 1950 and April 1967, there were 487 cases in which the validity of 
                                                                                                                   
 93 B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 1867. 
 94 Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30. 
 95 See Code of Civil Procedure 1908, § 113; Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, § 395; 
Shreeshyla Crowns v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1983 Kar. 130 [22].  However, some 
administrative tribunals can adjudicate upon challenges to the constitutional validity of 
statutes.  See L. Chandra kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125 (India).  
 96 See supra note 65. 
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legislation was specifically challenged.97  Remarkably, in 128 of these cases, 
one or more provisions of primary legislation was declared invalid.98  
This Part considers two mechanisms employed by the Indian Parliament 
in responding to declarations of unconstitutionality—fundamental rights 
amendments and “Ninth Schedule” amendments.  Both of these response 
mechanisms were conceptualized by the Constituent Assembly of India, but 
acting in different capacities. The power to amend the Constitution, 
including the chapter on fundamental rights, formed part of the original 
constitutional text enacted in 1949, and was a product of the debates of the 
Constituent Assembly.99  “Ninth Schedule” amendments are a special species 
of constitutional amendment developed by the Constituent Assembly, in its 
capacity as Provisional Parliament of India,100 after the Constitution entered 
into force. 
This Part argues that, through the response mechanisms available to 
Parliament, declarations of unconstitutionality have not necessarily 
constituted a “final word” on the validity of primary legislation violating 
fundamental rights, but have instead left room for political responses.  Two 
primary arguments will be made.  The first is that on some occasions, 
declarations of unconstitutionality have triggered parliamentary response 
through fundamental rights amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments.  
The second argument is that in spite of assertions to the contrary, which have 
been made based on a misreading of Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
Parliament still retains the space to respond to declarations of 
unconstitutionality through these two response mechanisms. 
A.  Fundamental Rights Amendments  
1.  The Nature of the Amending Power  
The power to amend the Constitution is set out in Article 368.  The 
relevant portion of this provision reads as follows: 
                                                                                                                   
 97 George H. Gadbois, Jr, Indian Judicial Behaviour, 5(3) EPW 149, 152 (1970). 
 98 Id. There is no empirical data recording the number of statutes challenged and 
invalidated by the Supreme Court post-1967.  Further, no comprehensive empirical analysis of 
this nature has been conducted vis-à-vis the High Courts. 
 99 See Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Sept. 17, 1949). 
 100 See Arudra Burra, The Cobwebs of Imperial Rule, 615 SEMINAR 79, 81 (2010). 
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368. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, 
Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by 
way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this 
Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this 
article. 
(2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by 
the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of 
Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a 
majority of the total membership of that House and by a 
majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that 
House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President 
who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the 
Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms 
of the Bill: 
Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in  
(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or 
(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of 
Part XI, or 
(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or  
(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or  
(e) the provisions of this article, 
the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the 
Legislature of not less than one half of the States by resolution 
to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill 
making provision for such amendment is presented to the 
President for assent. 
Article 368 thus provides for a “dual majority”101 procedure for 
constitutional amendments. An amendment needs to be passed by a simple 
majority of the total membership in the Upper and Lower Houses of 
Parliament.  It also needs to be passed by a majority of not less than two-
thirds of the members of each House, present and voting.  No explicit 
limitation on Parliament’s amending power was originally included in the 
Constitution.102  The amendment of some constitutional provisions 
concerning federal matters requires ratification by the legislatures of at least 
                                                                                                                   
 101 ARVIND DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 2017 (2d ed. 2007). 
 102 The Supreme Court imposed doctrinal limits on the power to amend the Constitution in 
the Basic Structure Case, see infra Part.III.A.4.  
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half the states in India.  Fundamental rights can be amended without the 
ratification of state legislatures. 
In the sixty-three years since it entered into force, the Constitution has 
been amended on numerous occasions.  As of January 2012, Parliament had 
passed ninety-seven constitutional amendments, with several others still on 
the anvil.  Some of these involved minor changes to the Constitution103 while 
others, such as the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment Act) 1976, sought 
to transform the nature of the Constitution itself.104  Whereas certain portions 
of the Constitution have remained intact as originally enacted,105 others, 
including the part on fundamental rights, have been amended on several 
occasions.  Although some people argue that these amendments have been 
motivated by “narrow political ends” and to pander to “vote-bank 
politics,”106 it is unfair to paint all constitutional amendments with the same 
motivational brush.107  
A common thread runs through some of these constitutional amendments; 
they have been passed with the objective of nullifying declarations of 
unconstitutionality.  In other words, the substratum of judgments invalidating 
legislation held to breach fundamental rights has been removed through 
amendment of the higher law on which they were grounded.  These will be 
referred to as “fundamental rights amendments.”  At least four,108 out of 
ninety-seven constitutional amendments studied can be identified as 
fundamental rights amendments.109  
2.  The Doctrine of Eclipse and Specific Savings Clauses 
In order to analyze the manner in which fundamental rights amendments 
can be employed as a parliamentary response mechanism, it is useful to 
briefly introduce the doctrine of eclipse.  The doctrine of eclipse is a 
judicially crafted doctrine that postulates that when a statute or parts of it are 
                                                                                                                   
 103 See, e.g., the Constitution (Ninety-sixth Amendment) Act, 2011, which altered the name 
of one of the languages recognized in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. 
 104 NANI A. PALKHIVALA, WE THE PEOPLE 201 (2007). 
 105 See, e.g., INDIA CONST. Part XVII, chs. I, II. 
 106 MADHAV GODBOLE, THE JUDICIARY AND GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 32 (2009). 
 107 See M.C. SETALVAD, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, 1950–1965 (1968) (defending the 
amendments made during the first fifteen years of constitutional experience in India). 
 108 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) 
Act, 1955; The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964; The Constitution (Twenty-
fifth Amendment) Act, 1971. 
 109 This comprises a little over 4% of the total number of constitutional amendments. 
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declared unconstitutional for violating a fundamental right, it is not treated as 
having been wiped off the statute book altogether.110  A shadow descends 
over the statute or its invalid provisions, which is lifted when the 
constitutional bar ceases to operate.  It also continues to remain in force with 
respect to persons who do not enjoy the fundamental right in question.111  
The statute thus remains in a “state of suspension”112 and can be brought 
back into operation when the constitutional provision based on which the 
legislation was struck down is itself amended.113  The constitutional barrier 
having been removed, the eclipse over the legislation would stand lifted.114 
That the doctrine of eclipse can operate to resuscitate pre-constitutional 
legislation115 is a matter of judicial consensus.116  What remains contested is 
whether the doctrine applies to post-constitutional legislation.117  In some 
cases, the Supreme Court118 and High Courts119 have held that the doctrine 
                                                                                                                   
 110 MAHENDRA PRASAD SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA’S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 31 (10th ed. 2003).  
This reflects the difference between Parliament’s power to repeal a statute and courts’ powers 
to declare a statute invalid.  Judge Deshpande describes the former as “express repeal” and the 
latter as “implied repeal.”  P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna, A.I.R. 1971 (Del.) 1, 28 (India).  This 
terminology is, however, linguistically jarring, since courts do not repeal legislation in any 
sense of the term; they simply disapply legislation that violates fundamental rights.  Further, 
implied repeal is an expression that is often used in the context of Parliament enacting 
legislation that is inconsistent with, but does not expressly supersede, existing legislation.  See 
also Note, What Is the Effect of a Court’s Declaring a Legislative Act Unconstitutional?, 39 
HARV. L. REV. 373 (1926); Earl Crawford, The Legislative Status of an Unconstitutional 
Statute, 49 MICH. L. REV. 645 (1951). 
 111 For instance, in State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1300, a law was 
struck down for contravening a fundamental right enjoyed by citizens.  The Supreme Court 
held that the law would continue to apply to non-citizens. 
 112 P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna, A.I.R. 1971 Del. 1, 29 (India) (Deshpande, J.).  
 113 Field describes amending the constitution as a “difficult but perfectly feasible method of 
removing constitutional obstacles from the path of statutes or of enlarging legislative powers” 
Oliver P. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 1 IND. L.J. 1 (1935). 
 114 Crawford, supra note 110. 
 115 This refers to all laws in force (including colonial legislation enacted during the British rule) 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (i.e., before January 26, 1950). 
 116 Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1951 S.C.R. 228 (India); Bhikaji 
Narain Dhakras et al. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1955 S.C.R. 589 (India); Behram 
Khurshed Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 123 (India). 
 117 This refers to all laws that come into force after the commencement of the Constitution 
(i.e., after January 26, 1950).  This is peculiar and counter-intuitive, as it effectively places 
colonial legislation on a higher plane compared to legislation passed after the Indian 
Constitution was enacted. 
 118 See Sundararamier v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C.R. 1422 (India); State of 
Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills, A.I.R. 1974 S.C.R. 760 (India); K.K. Poonacha v. State of 
Karnataka, (2010) 9 S.C.C. 671 (India) (in this case, however, the court observed that the 
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would apply equally to post-constitutional laws, saving Parliament from the 
costs of re-enactment of a statute declared unconstitutional.  Other Supreme 
Court120 and High Court121 decisions suggest that the doctrine only applies to 
laws that came into being before the Constitution, and that post-
constitutional legislation that contravenes fundamental rights is “still born” 
and would be considered a nullity.122  Academic opinion on the issue is also 
divided.123 
The operation of the doctrine of eclipse vis-à-vis post-constitutional laws 
that violate fundamental rights has important practical implications. The 
legislature that enacted a law that is resuscitated through the doctrine of 
eclipse does not have to take recourse to fresh parliamentary procedure and 
associated majorities.  Constitutional amendments, on the other hand, need to 
be passed by a special majority in Parliament.  Even so, the political 
relevance of the doctrine would be substantial in situations where the fresh 
enactment of a statute invalidated by a court may not secure a simple 
majority vote in Parliament, whereas a constitutional amendment having the 
effect of resuscitating the invalidated statute may find sufficient support to 
secure a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  It is not difficult to imagine 
situations where consensus prevails over broad constitutional principles, but 
                                                                                                                   
doctrine of eclipse operates vis-à-vis post-constitutional laws that fail to comply with 
procedural requirements laid down in Part III of the Constitution, not post-constitutional laws 
that take away substantive rights provided for in Part III).  
 119 P.L. Mehara v. D.R. Khanna, A.I.R. 1971 Delhi 1 (India).  The dissenting opinion of 
Judge Deshpande is one of the most elaborate defenses of the doctrine of eclipse from the 
bench.  See also Minoo Framroze Balsara v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 Bom. 375 (India); 
Nataraj Chhabigrin v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 (All.) 375 (India). 
 120 See Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C.R. Supp. 8 (India); Mahendra 
Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C.R. Supp. 912 (India); Rakesh Vij v. 
Raminder Sethi, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3593.  
 121 See Bawa Singh v. Union of India, (1970) 6 D.L.T. 409; Ram Chand v. State of Haryana 
(1971) 73 P.L.R. 958; P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna, 1971 A.I.R. 19th (Del.) 1 (India); Dharam 
Pal v. Kaushalya Devi, A.I.R. 1990 (Raj.) 135 (India). 
 122 But see State of Maharashtra v. Kamal Durgule, (1985) 1985 S.C.R. 129 (India). 
 123 The following commentators subscribe to the view that the doctrine of eclipse should 
apply to post-constitutional laws: S. Venkataran, The Status of an Unconstitutional Statute, 2 
J.I.L.I. 401 (1960); H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 420–21 (4th ed. 1996); 
SINGH, supra note 110, at 38–40.  However, many others are in the opposite camp: DURGA 
DAS BASU, LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 423–88 (1972); Sushila Rao, The 
Doctrine of Eclipse in Constitutional Law: A Critical Reappraisal of Its Contemporary Scope 
and Relevance, 18 STUDENT B. REV. 45 (2006); DATAR, supra note 101, at 53; CHAKRADHAR 
JHA, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS 321 (2d ed. 2009). 
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not over the manner in which those principles should be given effect—the 
devil is often in the detail. 
However, the specific terms in which a constitutional amendment is 
enacted may obviate the need to invoke the doctrine of eclipse.  So where a 
constitutional amendment contains a specific savings clause reviving 
legislation that has been previously declared invalid,124 it performs the same 
task as the doctrine of eclipse would in the circumstances. 
3.  Fundamental Rights Amendments as a Response Mechanism 
Precisely how can the power to amend fundamental rights under the 
Constitution be employed by Parliament as a response mechanism to 
overcome judicial decisions striking down primary legislation?  The 
possibilities crucially depend upon two factors: whether the doctrine of 
eclipse is applicable in the circumstance (alternatively, whether the 
amendment contains a specific savings clause of the kind just described) and 
whether the constitutional amendment applies prospectively or 
retrospectively.  A hypothetical example brings out the alternatives.  The 
Indian Constitution entered into force in 1950.  In 1965, a statute, 
“UnconStat,” was enacted by Parliament.  In 1966, the Supreme Court 
declares UnconStat unconstitutional on the basis that it violates a 
fundamental right.  
Parliament would have the following options in 1970.  If the doctrine of 
eclipse applied in the circumstances or if the amendment contains a specific 
savings clause, a retrospective constitutional amendment would resuscitate 
UnconStat, which would once again become operative without needing fresh 
enactment.125  In this scenario, a prospective constitutional amendment 
would not lift UnconStat out of the shadow of invalidity, since the 
amendment would apply to statutes enacted post-1970.  If the doctrine of 
eclipse does not apply and if the amendment does not contain a specific 
savings clause, even a retrospective constitutional amendment would not 
resuscitate UnconStat, since it cannot be revived from its state of 
                                                                                                                   
 124 See, e.g., INDIA CONST. amend. 1 § 2 cl. 1 (“No law in force in the territory of India 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution which is consistent with the 
provisions of article 19 of the Constitution as amended by sub-section (1) of this section should 
be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that, being law which takes 
away or abridges the right conferred by clause (a) of clause (1) of the said article, its operation 
was not saved by clause (2) of that articles as originally acted.” (emphasis added)). 
 125 P.L. Mehra v. D.R. Khanna, A.I.R. 1971 (Dec.) 1 (India).  
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unconstitutionality.  However, in this case, if a law identical to UnconStat is 
passed after 1965 (say, in 1968) and is not struck down as unconstitutional 
until 1970, the law would be protected by the amendment.  Finally, if the 
doctrine of eclipse applies or if the amendment contains a specific savings 
clause and the constitutional amendment is prospective, the cause of 
unconstitutionality is treated as having been removed only in 1970.126  Thus, 
the 1968 statute which is still to be struck down will, for all times to come, 
remain unprotected by the amendment.  Only fresh statutes enacted after 
1970 would be protected by it.  
Of course, in all cases where UnconStat is not resuscitated automatically 
by the constitutional amendment, it can be re-enacted by Parliament in the 
same terms with the expectation that, the Constitution having been amended, 
it cannot be declared unconstitutional based on the same infirmity.  The 
doctrine of eclipse or a specific savings clause therefore renders 
constitutional amendments more potent as response mechanisms than they 
would have been in its absence, since retrospective constitutional 
amendments coupled with the doctrine of eclipse or a specific savings clause 
automatically validate legislation that was declared unconstitutional. 
To support this argument, I have selected some judgments of the Supreme 
Court and High Courts that have been nullified through constitutional 
amendments.127  These judgments have been selected on the basis of two 
characteristics.  First, only cases that involved a challenge to primary 
legislation have been considered, since this Article compares responses to 
judicial review of primary legislation in India and the U.K.128  Second, I have 
only selected cases where legislation was declared unconstitutional for 
violating fundamental rights under Part III of the constitution, although this 
need not have been the court’s only reason for declaring the statute 
unconstitutional.129  This naturally means that no judgments striking down 
primary legislation for breaching constitutional rights outside of Part III of 
the constitution have been considered.130  
                                                                                                                   
 126 BASU, supra note 19, at 939. 
 127 The underlying rationale for this is to ensure a comparison between equals, since judicial 
review of primary legislation for breaching Convention rights (comprising of civil and 
political human rights) in the U.K. cannot be compared with judicial review in India based, for 
instance, on the federal distribution of powers or the freedom of inter-state trade. 
 128 BASU, supra note 19. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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These judgments are worth examining in order to expound upon the 
manner in which Parliament has used fundamental rights amendments as a 
response mechanism.131  Particularly in the early years of constitutional 
experience, a frequent governmental response to inconvenient judicial 
decisions was to veer towards a change in the Constitution.132 
In Shaila Bala Devi v Chief Secretary, the petitioner sought a declaration 
from the Patna High Court that Section 4(1)(a) of the Indian Press 
(Emergency Powers) Act 1931, which penalized the publication of any 
documents which incited or encouraged the commission of murder or any 
cognizable offenses involving violence, breached the freedom of speech and 
expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.133  The majority 
declared the provision unconstitutional on the basis that it violated the 
freedom of speech and expression and did not fall under one of the 
permissible exceptions under Article 19(2).134  At the time, the only 
permissible exception was law relating to libel, slander, defamation, 
contempt of court or “any matter which offends against decency or morality 
or which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow the State.”135  
Similarly, in Romesh Thapar v State of Madras,136 the Supreme Court found 
Section 9(1A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act 1949 (which 
authorized a ban on the circulation of documents to secure “public safety” 
and “public order”) overbroad as it violated Article 19(1)(a) without falling 
within the scope of the exceptions laid down in Article 19(2).137  By the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, the exceptions provided for in 
Article 19(2) were expanded by Parliament so as to clearly encompass cases 
such as Shaila Bala and Romesh Thapar.138  The amendment was 
                                                                                                                   
 131 Id. 
 132 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty, in THE STATE OF INDIA’S 
DEMOCRACY 111 (Sumit Ganguly et al. eds., 2007).  Phioze Irani, The Courts and the 
Legislature in India, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 950, 952 (1965) (it was “common” for 
parliamentarians to demand constitutional amendments to nullify important judicial 
pronouncements that were not to their liking). 
 133 Shalia Bala Devi v. Chief Sec’y, A.I.R. 1951 (Pat.) 12 (India). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (India). 
 138 The constitutional amendment also nullified four other judgments, which declared 
statutes unconstitutional for violating the freedom of speech and expression: Brij Bhushan v. 
State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 245; Amar Nath Bali v. State, (1950) 1951 CRIM. L.J. 261; 
Srinivasa Bhat v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 (Mad.) 70; Tara Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1951 
Punjab 27.  See Aruda Burra, Arguments from Colonial Continuity: The Constitution (First 
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retrospective in operation and contained a specific savings clause protecting 
legislation that was declared void under the original version of Article 19.139  
Parliament thus effectively nullified the two judgments and revived the 
statutes by altering the constitutionally permissible restrictions on the 
freedom of expression.  In fact, when Shaila Bala was appealed to the 
Supreme Court after the amendment was enacted, the Patna High Court’s 
judgment was reversed on the basis that the constitutional amendment 
decisively concluded the matter.140 
In State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee, the constitutionality of a 
provision of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 was 
at issue before the Supreme Court.141  The statute was enacted primarily for 
the settlement of immigrants who had migrated into the province of West 
Bengal and provided for the acquisition and development of land.  Persons 
whose land was acquired under the statute contended that Section 8, which 
restricted the amount of compensation payable on acquisition so as not to 
exceed the market value of the land on a fixed date, violated the right to 
compensation under the (erstwhile)142 fundamental right to property laid 
down in Article 31(2) of the Constitution.  The Court accepted the argument 
and declared the relevant section unconstitutional for failing to comply with 
the “letter and spirit” of Article 31(2).143  Parliament promptly responded 
through a constitutional amendment that excluded the inquiry into the 
adequacy of compensation paid for acquisition of land from judicial 
                                                                                                                   
Amendment) Act, 1951 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i 
d=2052659.  
 139 INDIA CONST. amend. 1 § 3 cl. 2 (“No law in force in the territory of India immediately 
before the commencement of the Constitution which is consistent with the provisions of 
article 19 of the Constitution as amended by sub-section (1) of this section shall be deemed to 
be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground only that, being a law which takes away 
or abridges the right conferred by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of the said article, its operation 
was not saved by clause (2) of that article as originally enacted.”).  This savings clause 
obviated the need to invoke the doctrine of eclipse in order to revive the statutory provision 
declared invalid.  
 140 State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, (1952) S.C.R. 654 (India). 
 141 State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee, (1953) 1954 S.C.R. 558 (India). 
 142 The fundamental rights to Property under articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution 
were deleted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.  However, the 
amendment inserted Article 300A into the Constitution, which reads: “Persons not to be 
deprived of property save by authority of law—No person shall be deprived of his property 
save by authority of law.”  Thus, the right to property remains a (non-fundamental) 
constitutional right.  INDIA CONST. art. 300A. 
 143 State of West Bengal v. Bella Banerjee, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 170, 11 (India). 
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consideration.144  The judgment of the Supreme Court was therefore 
neutralized by amending the constitutional provision upon which it rested. 
Similarly, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964 was 
employed by Parliament to nullify two judgments.  In the first, the Supreme 
Court declared the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act 1961 unconstitutional in 
relation to its application to certain kinds of lands because it violated the 
right to equality under Article 14.145  The Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the statute fell within the protective umbrella of Article 31A, 
which saved laws providing for the acquisition of estates from scrutiny under 
Articles 14,146 19,147 and 31148 of the Constitution. In the second case, the 
same statute was found by the Kerala High Court to violate Articles 14, 19, 
and 31 of the Constitution.149  The constitutional amendment passed by 
Parliament expanded the scope of Article 31A so as to include within its 
protective cloak the kind of legislation that was at issue in the two cases.150  
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the constitutional amendment in 
two subsequent decisions.151  Since the amendment did not contain a specific 
savings clause (and the doctrine of eclipse was not invoked), the state 
legislature enacted fresh legislation with similar objectives in place of the 
invalidated statute.152 
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, better known as the Bank Nationalization 
Case, provides yet another example of parliamentary response to 
declarations of unconstitutionality.153  The petitioner, a shareholder and 
director of a bank, challenged primary legislation154 seeking to nationalize 
                                                                                                                   
 144 INDIA CONST. amend. 4.  Parliament also inserted the West Bengal Land Development 
and Planning Act, 1948 into the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, the significance of which 
will be discussed in Part III.B. 
 145 Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 273 (India). 
 146 The right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. 
 147 The right to certain freedoms, including the freedom of speech and the freedom of trade. 
 148 The right to property.  See supra note 142. 
 149 Sabkayogam v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1963 (Ker.) 101 (India). 
 150 Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. 
 151 Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 933 (India); Golaknath v. State of 
Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 (India).  In Golaknath, the constitutional amendment was upheld 
subject to the qualification that Parliament could no longer amend Part III of the Constitution 
after the date of the Court’s decision.  This view was later overruled in the Basic Structure Case. 
 152 Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.  This statute was also inserted into the Ninth Schedule, 
the relevance of which will be discussed below.  See INDIA CONST. Ninth Sched., amended 
by The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 (Entry 39).  
 153 (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 (India). 
 154 Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969. 
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fourteen Indian banks.155  An eleven judge bench of the Supreme Court 
declared the statute unconstitutional because it breached the right to equality 
under Article 14, the right to freedom of trade under Article 19(1)(g) and, the 
rights to property provided for by Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2).156  Looked 
upon by many within the government as a judgment which impeded the 
“building of a socialist economy,”157 Parliament passed a constitutional 
amendment to roll back the effects of the decision.158  Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court upheld the amendment (barring one portion of it).159  Once 
again, since the amendment did not contain a specific savings clause, 
Parliament enacted another statute with the same objectives.160  In light of 
the constitutional amendment the new statute was not open to constitutional 
challenge on the same basis.  
It is interesting to note that for the large part, courts upheld fundamental 
rights amendments passed by successive Parliaments.161  In the words of 
Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri, “to make a law which contravenes the 
constitution constitutionally valid is a matter . . . [which lies] within the 
exclusive power of Parliament.”162  This statement provides a useful lead into 
the next section, which considers the scope of the amending power. 
4.  Scope and Limitations of the Amending Power 
Recurrent constitutional amendments have given rise to one of the most 
politically loaded questions of Indian constitutional law: are there any 
limitations on the amending power of Parliament?  Article 13(2) of the 
Constitution prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or 
abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.163  A significant 
issue that frequently arose in litigation was whether the term “law” in Article 
                                                                                                                   
 155 R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 (India). 
 156 Id. 
 157 S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, Slide-Back on Compensation: Bank Nationalism Judgment, 
5 ECON. & POL. WKLY., 356, 356 (1970). 
 158 The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971. 
 159 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India). 
 160 Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970.  This statute 
applied retrospectively and predated the constitutional amendment. 
 161 See Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 89 (India); Sajjan Singh v. State of 
Rajasthan, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 933 (India); Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 
(India); Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
 162 Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 89. 
 163 INDIAN CONST. art. 13, ¶ 2. 
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13 included constitutional amendments.  If it did, that would mean that 
Parliament lacked the constitutional authority to amend fundamental rights. 
When confronted with this question, a unanimous five-judge bench164 of 
the Supreme Court initially decided that “law” did not include constitutional 
amendments, paving the way for Parliament to amend any part of the 
Constitution, including Part III.165  Thirteen years later, the majority on a 
five-judge bench of the Supreme Court agreed.166  However, two judges 
expressed skepticism about the accuracy of this conclusion.167  Judge 
Hidayatullah wrote that “stronger reasons” were required in order to arrive at 
this decision.168  Judge Mudholkar, on the other hand, articulated that the 
Constituent Assembly might have intended to give permanency to the “basic 
features of the Constitution.”169  But, he chose not to develop what he meant 
by “basic features” of the Constitution were in any detail. 
A few years later, the issue was referred to a bench of eleven judges of 
the Supreme Court in Golaknath v. State of Punjab.170  Aggrieved by the 
impact of land reform legislation, several litigants filed writ petitions in the 
Supreme Court.171  They claimed that such legislation, along with certain 
constitutional amendments that protected the legislation, should be declared 
unconstitutional for breaching their fundamental rights.172  On this occasion, 
by a thin majority of six to five, the Supreme Court held that constitutional 
amendments constituted “law” within the purview of Article 13(2), rendering 
Part III of the Constitution inviolable.173  However, the majority applied the 
doctrine of “prospective overruling” to avoid the chaos and confusion that 
                                                                                                                   
 164 In the Supreme Court of India, only benches comprising the same or a larger number of 
judges can overrule precedent Chintan Chandrachud, The Supreme Court of India’s Practice 
of Referring Cases to Larger Benches: A Need for Review, 1 SUP. CT. CASES J. 37 (2010). 
 165 Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 89 (India). 
 166 Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 845 (India) (Gajendragadkar, C.J.). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 49 (Hidayatullah, J., dissenting). 
 169 Id. at 61 (Mudholkar, J., concurring). 
 170 Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 (India). 
 171 Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court of India at 
first instance for the enforcement of fundamental rights under Part III.  INDIA CONST. art. 32. 
 172 Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762. 
 173 Since Article 13(2) only prevents Parliament from making any law which “takes away or 
abridges” the rights conferred by Part III, Golaknath did not imply that the fundamental rights 
could not be enlarged or advanced through constitutional amendment.  See R.S. GAE, THE 
BANK NATIONALISATION CASE AND THE CONSTITUTION 139 (1971). 
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would follow the invalidation of existing constitutional amendments and the 
statutes on which they were based.174 
In 1973, Golaknath was reconsidered by an unprecedented thirteen-judge 
bench of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala 
(Basic Structure Case).175  This case arose out of six writ petitions 
challenging land redistribution legislation and the constitutional amendments 
that protected it.176  Eleven separate opinions, comprising over 400,000 
words, were delivered in one of the longest appellate decisions of the last 
century.177  What complicates the judgments in the Basic Structure Case is 
the discord between what the judges said and what they were understood to 
mean by subsequent benches, who relied on a questionable “summary” of the 
majority’s decision signed by nine of the thirteen judges.178  It is 
painstakingly difficult to find common ground between the reasoning of the 
seven judges that form the “majority” in the case.179  However, subsequent 
judgments of the Supreme Court consider the ratio decidendi of the Basic 
Structure Case to be that although the term “law” in Article 13(2) does not 
include constitutional amendments, and thus Parliament could amend any 
part of the Constitution (including Part III), the power of amendment under 
Article 368 of the Constitution does not include the power to alter, abrogate, 
or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.180  Thus, the “basic 
structure” doctrine postulates that although Parliament may amend any part 
of the Constitution, a constitutional amendment that destroys, alters or 
abrogates its basic structure can be struck down as an “unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment.”  What comprised the basic structure of the 
Constitution was left open, allowing judges to develop the concept 
jurisprudentially.  The Supreme Court has identified a number of principles 
falling within the purview of the basic structure doctrine: the supremacy of 
                                                                                                                   
 174 Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762. 
 175 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Vivek Krishnamurthy, Note, Colonial Cousins: Explaining India and Canada’s 
Unwritten Constitutional Principles, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 207, 255 (2009).  
 178 SEERVAI, supra note 123, at 3114; T.R. ANDHYARUJINA, THE KESAVANANDA BHARATI 
CASE 63–67 (2011). 
 179 GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN 
EXPERIENCE 265 (2003); SUDHIR KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
INDIA 27 (2009); ANDHYARUJINA, supra note 178. 
 180 Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 347 (India); Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of 
India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 206 (India) (Chandrachud, C.J.); Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 
2 S.C.R. 1 (India). 
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the Constitution,181 secularism,182 the sovereignty of India,183 federalism,184 
judicial review,185 the limited power to amend the Constitution186 and free 
and fair elections.187  
The key difference between Golaknath and the Basic Structure Case, for 
the purpose of my argument, is that whereas the former embodied a rigid 
restriction on the amendability of Part III, the latter incorporated functional 
flexibility, allowing Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution subject 
to the “basic structure” qualification.188 
Thus, Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution has been attenuated 
by the Basic Structure Case and subsequent decisions.  The existing position 
of law on Parliament’s ability to nullify judgments declaring legislation 
unconstitutional for violations of fundamental rights through constitutional 
amendments is as follows: not all fundamental rights form part of the basic 
structure of the Constitution––if they did, the Basic Structure decision’s 
relative flexibility in comparison with Golaknath would have been 
meaningless.189  It would be impermissible for Parliament to amend a 
fundamental right to the extent that the basic structure of the Constitution 
would be abrogated.  However, it is still open to Parliament to nullify a 
declaration of unconstitutionality by amending a fundamental right without 
altering the basic structure of the Constitution.  The possibility of Parliament 
responding to declarations of unconstitutionality through fundamental rights 
amendments without having an impact on the basic structure of the 
Constitution is discussed in greater detail later.190 
                                                                                                                   
 181 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461, 1171 (India) (Ray, J.), 
302 (Sikri, J.), 599 (Shelat, J. and Grover, J.).  
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 1171 (Ray, J.), 599 (Shelat, J. and Grover, J.), 682 (Hegde, J. and Mukherjea, J.). 
 184 Id. at 302 (Sikri, J.), 599 (Shelat, J. and Grover, J.).  
 185 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125 (India). 
 186 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 (India). 
 187 Special Reference No. 1 of 2002 A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 87 (India). 
 188 M.P. Jain, The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF INDIA 11–12 (2003). 
 189 Initially, Judge Khanna’s judgment in the Basic Structure Case was understood by some 
to mean that no fundamental rights formed part of the basic structure of the Constitution.  But 
Judge Khanna later issued a clarification stating that his opinion was not intended to suggest 
this.  Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 347, 251–52 (India). 
 190 See infra Part III.C. 
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B.  Ninth Schedule Amendments 
“[T]he Indian is the only constitution . . . 
providing for protection against itself.”191 
1.  Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule 
The Ninth Schedule resembles an appendix to the Constitution and is 
associated with a special species of constitutional amendments.  It is linked 
to Article 31B, which reads as follows: 
Validation of certain Acts and Regulations.  Without prejudice 
to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A, 
none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth 
Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to 
be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such 
Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away 
or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of 
this Part [Part III of the Constitution], and notwithstanding any 
judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the 
contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to 
the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, 
continue in force.192 
Legislative override through Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule did not 
originally form part of the Constitution.  It was included through 
constitutional amendment in 1951 in order to immunize agrarian reform 
legislation from judicial scrutiny for contravening one or more fundamental 
rights under Part III.193  More than 280 statutes currently lie within the 
confines of the Ninth Schedule, some of which have little to do with land 
                                                                                                                   
 191 Granville Austin citing what Chief Justice Gajendragadkar had, according to “judicial 
lore,” said about the Ninth Schedule.  AUSTIN, supra note 179, at 85.  For the record, this 
statement was putatively made well before the “notwithstanding” clause under Section 33 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and similar mechanisms (such as under Section 
8 of the Israeli Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) came into existence.     
 192 INDIA CONST. art. 31B. 
 193 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.  Austin describes the Schedule as a 
“constitutional vault” to which the judges were denied the key.  AUSTIN, supra note 179, at 98. 
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reform.194  Since the Ninth Schedule is a part of the Constitution, statutes can 
be added to it only through the special procedure for constitutional 
amendments specified in Article 368.  Central or state legislation may be 
inserted into the Ninth Schedule, although only Parliament, which is 
entrusted with the power of amending the Constitution, can do so.  Further, 
because Article 31B contains a specific savings clause protecting legislation 
notwithstanding any judgment it performs the same task that the doctrine of 
eclipse would have in the circumstances by automatically reviving laws 
declared to be unconstitutional inserted into the Ninth Schedule without fresh 
enactment.  This explains why the doctrine of eclipse does not need to be 
invoked in cases where Parliament responds to a judgment by inserting 
legislation into the Ninth Schedule.195  
2.  The Ninth Schedule as a Parliamentary Response Mechanism 
There are three possible stages at which Parliament may decide to insert 
legislation into the Ninth Schedule.  First, it could choose to insert legislation 
into the Schedule to avoid an adverse judicial decision altogether.196  Second, 
it could pre-empt a final decision by a court by inserting legislation into the 
Schedule in cases where a court has granted interim relief suspending its 
operation during the pendency of a case.197  Third, it could insert legislation 
that has already been declared unconstitutional into the Ninth Schedule to lift 
it from the shadow of unconstitutionality, since the legislation would be 
treated as never having become void.198  This part will focus on the third use 
of the Ninth Schedule as a response mechanism that takes the form of an 
attempt to immunize statutes (or statutory provisions) that have been finally 
adjudicated upon and declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and 
High Courts.  Uses of the Ninth Schedule that bear this character will be 
                                                                                                                   
 194 See, e.g., The Essential Commodities Act (1955) (entry 126), the Smugglers and Foreign 
Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act (1976) (entry 127) and the Levy Sugar 
Price Equalisation Fund Act (1976) (entry 131).  Baldev Singh categorised the legislation 
inserted into the Ninth Schedule up to 1990 (Baldev Singh, Ninth Schedule to Constitution of 
India: A Study, 37(4) J.I.L.I. 457, 467 (1995)).  His analysis shows that a little over 87% of 
statutes inserted into the Ninth Schedule dealt with agrarian/land reform. 
 195 Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 425 [33–34]. 
 196 The Constitution (Forty-seventh Amendment) Act, 1984; The Constitution (Sixty-sixth 
Amendment) Act, 1990. 
 197 The Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976. 
 198 INDIA CONST. art. 31B. 
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referred to as “Ninth Schedule amendments.” At least five199 (or a little over 
five percent) of the ninety-seven constitutional amendments enacted as of 
January 2012 represent Ninth Schedule amendments of the nature just 
described.  
A few examples shed light on how Parliament has responded to 
judgments declaring legislation unconstitutional for violating fundamental 
rights through the Ninth Schedule.  In Balmadies Plantations v. State of 
Tamil Nadu,200 a group of petitions challenged the constitutional validity of a 
statute201 which sought to transfer private forest lands to the state 
government.  The Madras High Court dismissed the petitions.202  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute except in so far as it 
related to the transfer of forests in certain private estates to the government, 
which in its view violated Articles 14 (the right to equality), 19 (the right to 
freedom) and 31 (the right to property) of the Constitution.203  In a little over 
two years, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment inserting the statute 
into the Ninth Schedule.204  This ipso facto revived the portion of legislation 
that was struck down. 
In another example, the state of Kerala enacted the Kerala Land Reforms 
Act 1963 as the primary land reform law for the state. The statute was 
inserted into the Ninth Schedule to protect it from constitutional challenge on 
the touchstone of violating fundamental rights.205  In 1969, sweeping 
amendments were made to the law by an amending statute,206 which was not 
itself inserted into the Ninth Schedule.  The amended provisions of the 
Kerala Land Reforms Act were constitutionally challenged before the Kerala 
High Court.207  The Court opined that since the amending statute was not 
inserted into the Ninth Schedule, the provisions of the act, as amended by the 
subsequent statute, could not receive the protection of Article 31B.208  It 
                                                                                                                   
 199 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) 
Act, 1955; The Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1972; The Constitution (Thirty-
fourth Amendment) Act, 1974; The Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1990. 
 200 A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2240 (India). 
 201 Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969. 
 202 Nilambur Kovilagam v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1971) 1 M.L.J. 255 (India). 
 203 Id. 
 204 The Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974; INDIA CONST. Ninth Sched., 
Entry 80. 
 205 The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964; INDIA CONST. Ninth Sched., 
Entry 39. 
 206 Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969. 
 207 Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1971 Ker. 98 (India). 
 208 Id. 
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declared some statutory provisions unconstitutional for violating the right to 
equality under Article 14 and the right to property under Article 19(1)(f) of 
the Constitution.209  In appeal, the Supreme Court substantially confirmed the 
conclusions of the High Court.210  In a separate group of petitions, the 
Supreme Court also struck down another discrete aspect of the statute as 
amended in 1969.211  Within two months of the Supreme Court’s judgments, 
Parliament inserted the amending act of 1969 into the Ninth Schedule with 
the avowed objective of nullifying the effects of this group of decisions.212  
The invalidated legislation was thus automatically revived without requiring 
fresh enactment. 
In Paschimbanga v. State of West Bengal,213 the Calcutta High Court 
considered the validity of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act 
1979,214 a statute which provided for the levy of revenue on land holdings in 
the state.  Section 2(c) was declared invalid for granting excessive powers to 
the authority prescribed under the statute.215  Since the Court considered that 
this provision was not severable from the rest of the statute, the entire statute 
was rendered unenforceable.  About four years later, Parliament passed a 
constitutional amendment validating the West Bengal Land Holding 
Revenue Act of 1979 by inserting it into the Ninth Schedule.216  Yet again, 
the Ninth Schedule was employed as a constitutional device to roll back the 
effects of a judicial decision striking down primary legislation for breaching 
fundamental rights. 
3.  Reconciling the Conflict Between the Basic Structure Case and the 
Ninth Schedule 
There is a zone of conflict between the accepted dictum of the Basic 
Structure Case and the Ninth Schedule.  Whereas Article 31B along with the 
                                                                                                                   
 209 Id. 
 210 Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2097 (India). 
 211 Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala, (1973) 1 S.C.R. 399. 
 212 INDIA CONST. art. 65, amended by The Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act, 
1972 (The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the constitutional amendment 
make it clear that it was enacted in order to nullify the effects of these three judgments). 
 213 Paschimbanga v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 2 C.A.L.L.T. (Calcutta H.C.) 183. 
 214 The West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, No. 44 of 1979. 
 215 Invalidity on the basis of excessive delegation is inextricably linked to a breach of the 
right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.  Trs. for the Improvement of Calcutta v. 
Chandra Sekhar, (1978) 1 S.C.R. 136 (1977). 
 216 INDIA CONST. art. 250, amended by The Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1990. 
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Ninth Schedule sought to confer unlimited powers of constitutional 
amendment on Parliament so as to protect legislation from judicial review, 
the Basic Structure Case was an attempt to limit Parliament’s amending 
power and subject it to judicial scrutiny.217  The Supreme Court reconciled 
this conflict in I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu.218  A unanimous nine-
judge bench held that primary legislation inserted into the Ninth Schedule 
after the decision in the Basic Structure Case would be subjected to the 
“basic structure” test laid down in that decision.219  In other words, the 
insertion of legislation into the Ninth Schedule would be invalidated if it 
altered, abrogated, or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution.  The 
Court also held that some fundamental rights220 pertained to the basic 
structure of the Constitution.  The insertion of legislation into the Ninth 
Schedule would also be invalidated if the statute abrogated these 
fundamental rights.  The test that would be employed to determine whether a 
fundamental right pertaining to the basic structure was abrogated was the 
“rights test,” according to which the impact and effect of the constitutional 
amendment on fundamental rights would be relevant.221 
Thus, the status and level of protection accorded to statutes inserted into 
the Ninth Schedule has been circumscribed.  However, after the decision in 
Coelho, the possibility of Parliament validly inserting legislation that has 
been struck down for violating fundamental rights into the Ninth Schedule 
remains open.222 
                                                                                                                   
 217 Madhav Khosla, Addressing Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court: Towards an 
Evolved Debate, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 95 (2009). 
 218 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861 (this case reconsidered the 
Supreme Court’s judgment in Waman Rao v. Union of India which adjudged the same 
question.  (1981) 2 S.C.R. 1 (1980)). 
 219 Id. 
 220 These rights include Article 14 (the right to equality), Article 19 (which protects the 
freedom of speech and other rights) and Article 21 (the right to life and personal liberty).  The 
jury is out on precisely which fundamental rights pertain or do not pertain to the basic structure 
of the Constitution, since judicial decisions on this issue have been nebulous.  See Kamala 
Sankaran, From Brooding Omnipresence to Concrete Textual Provisions: The I.R. Coelho 
Judgment and the Creation of a Hierarchy of Fundamental Rights, 49(2) J.I.L.I. 240 (2007). 
 221 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861 [81].  
 222 Virendra Kumar, Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution: Doctrine of Constitutionally 
Controlled Governance, 49 J.I.L.I. 365 (2007). 
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C.  Assessing the Space for Parliamentary Response After Coelho 
The important point to be made is that the operational space for 
legislative response remains available after Coelho, albeit in a more 
restricted form.223  But Sorabjee argues that the decision in Coelho “in 
effect” renders fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution 
unamendable.224  This argument thus questions the status of constitutional 
amendments to fundamental rights as a parliamentary response mechanism.  
Randhawa reads Coelho as indicating that the inclusion of a statute that 
violated fundamental rights in the Ninth Schedule would be invalidated 
through the basic structure doctrine.225  Jaising makes a similar argument, 
stating that Coelho “virtually repeals” Article 31B of the Constitution and 
renders any violation of fundamental rights as an interference with the basic 
structure of the Constitution.226  If one were to accept their arguments, the 
Ninth Schedule is effectively eliminated as a response mechanism and could 
not be employed by Parliament to respond to judgments striking down 
legislation.  These arguments are now worth considering. 
Sorabjee’s contention fails to consider that Coelho and subsequent 
judgments emphasize that different tests must be applied in determining the 
validity of constitutional amendments altering the substantive content of 
fundamental rights and those merely inserting legislation into the Ninth 
Schedule, seeking to protect it from judicial scrutiny.  In the case of the 
former, the “essence of rights test” (as opposed to the “rights test”) is 
applied.  Under this test the court focuses on the impact of the amendment on 
the overarching principles espoused by the Constitution rather than the 
specific rights amended.  This means that fundamental rights could quite 
plausibly be amended to protect certain kinds of legislation that would 
otherwise be invalidated, without breaching the overarching principles 
                                                                                                                   
 223 Id. 
 224 Soli J. Sorabjee, Former Attorney Gen. for India, Lecture at Oslo University, Evolution 
of the Basic Structure Doctrine: Its Implications and Impact on Constitutional Amendments 
(Oct. 6, 2008), transcript available at http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/print_this_pa 
ge.asp?article_id=429. 
 225 Jasdeep Randhawa, Understanding Judicialization Of Mega-Politics: The Basic 
Structure Doctrine And Minimum Core, JUS POLITICUM No. 6 (2011).  She posits that the 
Supreme Court has exercised restraint in subsequent cases.  The more satisfactory position is 
that Coelho itself exhibits elements of restraint, leaving a fair amount of space to the 
legislature. 
 226 Indira Jaising, Ninth Schedule: What the Supreme Court judgment means, REDIFF (Jan. 
11, 2007), http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/jan/11indira.htm. 
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forming part of the basic structure, for instance, secularism, federalism, 
judicial review, etc.  
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Indian Medical Association v. Union of 
India227 confirms this claim.  In 2005, Parliament inserted Article 15(5) into 
Part III of the Constitution through a constitutional amendment.228  The 
amendment was directed at nullifying earlier decisions229 of the Supreme 
Court holding that state sanctioned imposition of reservation policy on non-
minority unaided educational institutions breached the freedom to carry on 
any occupation, trade or business under Article 19(1)(g).  The state of Delhi 
passed primary legislation230 that, in the absence of Article 15(5), would 
have been struck down as invalid.  The constitutionality of the insertion of 
Article 15(5) into the Constitution was challenged on basic structure doctrine 
grounds.  Rejecting the challenge, the Court observed that the question was 
not whether a fundamental right itself was amended, but whether, applying 
the “essence of rights” test, the overarching constitutional principles 
connecting fundamental rights were abrogated.231  Thus, an amendment to a 
fundamental right effectively shielded legislation that would have been 
declared unconstitutional in its absence without failing the basic structure 
test. 
The arguments of Randhawa and Jaising, which question the operational 
space available to Parliament after Coelho, are belied by the fact that in 
Coelho itself, the Court observed that some fundamental rights (including 
Articles 14,232 15,233 19,234 and 21235) formed a part of the basic structure.  
Further, applying the “rights test,” not every amendment which had some 
effect on fundamental rights pertaining to the basic structure would be 
considered invalid––only those which abridged or abrogated the 
                                                                                                                   
 227 India Med. Ass’n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 2365. 
 228 INDIA CONST. art. 15(5), amended by The Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 
2005. 
 229 T.M.A. Pai Found. v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 S.C.C. 481; P.A. Inamdar v. State of 
Maharashtra, (2005) 6 S.C.C. 537. 
 230 The Delhi Professional Colleges or Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee, 
Regulation of Admission, Fixation of Non-Exploitative Fee and other Measures to Ensures 
Equity and Excellence) Act, 2007. 
 231 Indian Med. Ass’n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 2365 [88]. 
 232 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861, 48 (the right to equality before 
the law and equal protection of the laws). 
 233 Id. at 57 (prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth). 
 234 Id. at 59 (protection of certain freedoms including the freedom of speech). 
 235 Id. at 60 (the right to life and personal liberty). 
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fundamental right, examined with reference to each individual case, would 
fail the basic structure test.236  If this were not the case, then Article 31B of 
the Constitution would become an empty provision.237 
Judges in Coelho and in previous cases have provided examples of 
legislation that might be declared unconstitutional for breaching Part III, but 
could be validly revived through the Ninth Schedule.  For example, in 
Coelho, Chief Justice Sabharwal held that freedom might be interfered with 
(presumably, to a limited extent) in cases relating to terrorism without the 
basic structure doctrine being triggered.238  In a previous decision, Chief 
Justice Chandrachud observed that “[i]f by a constitutional amendment, the 
application of Articles 14 and 19 is withdrawn from a defined field of 
legislative activity, which is reasonably in public interest, the basic 
framework of the Constitution may remain unimpaired.”239  Justice Krishna 
Iyer expressed the argument as follows:  
[W]hat is a betrayal of the basic feature [sic] is not a mere 
violation of Article 14 but a shocking, unconscionable or 
unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal 
justice. . . . the constitutional fascination for the basic structure 
doctrine [cannot] be made a Trojan horse to penetrate the entire 
legislative camp fighting for a new social order.240 
These quotations comprise judicial confirmation of the space available to 
Parliament to employ the Ninth Schedule as a response mechanism to 
judgments declaring primary legislation unconstitutional for breaching 
fundamental rights.241 
The exercise of the power to declare statutes unconstitutional for violating 
fundamental rights has not necessarily constituted the last word on the 
                                                                                                                   
 236 Id. at [58].  See also Indian Med. Ass’n v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2011 S.C. 2365 [84]. 
 237 Glanrock Estate v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 10 S.C.C. 96 [8]. 
 238 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861 [78]. 
 239 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 [70]. 
 240 Maharao Singhji v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 234 [21]. 
 241 Jasdeep Randhawa, Understanding Judicialization of Mega-Politics: The Basic Structure 
Doctrine and Minimums Core, JUS POLITICUM (2011), http://www.juspoliticum.com/IMG/pdf/ 
JP6-Randhawa.pdf.  Randhawa herself acknowledges that cases after Coelho have exhibited 
judicial restraint and re-opened the parliamentary space under the Ninth Schedule.  My 
argument is that this is a misreading of Coelho, as that case itself (along with decisions before 
it) recognised the space available to Parliament.  The approach of the Supreme Court in 
subsequent cases has been consistent with Coelho. 
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validity of primary legislation.  Two parliamentary response mechanisms 
have, individually or in conjunction, channeled the political responses to 
such exercises.  As Pratap Bhanu Mehta puts it (albeit in a broader context), 
an “iterative game of action-response-rejoinder” is in motion.242  The 
important point to take away from this section is that political actors in India 
retain the space to respond to declarations of unconstitutionality through 
fundamental rights amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments.  
IV.  THE U.K.: POLITICAL RESPONSES TO DECLARATIONS OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
This section focuses on the case law under Section 4 of the HRA and 
parliamentary and governmental responses to declarations of 
unconstitutionality in the U.K.  Three central arguments will be developed.  
First, the space for political responses to declarations of unconstitutionality is 
much narrower than that which is assumed in the existing scholarship.  
Second, expected political reactions to declarations of unconstitutionality are 
an important element in courts’ process of choosing between the remedial 
routes offered by Sections 3 and 4 of the HRA.  Third, given these and other 
relevant factors, it is unlikely that governments will ignore or reject 
declarations of unconstitutionality, although the argument that this power 
may atrophy or be politically neutralized through a constitutional convention 
over time warrants qualification.  
A.  Two Connotations of Space 
Commentators often engage with arguments concerning the “space” 
available to Parliament and government in responding to declarations of 
unconstitutionality without defining that protean word.  For the sake of 
clarity, the word “space” will be defined in two different senses.  The first is 
decisional space, which raises the question about whether Parliament and 
government are obliged to accept declarations of unconstitutionality to begin 
with.  In theory, when a declaration of unconstitutionality is made, the 
government has the following options in terms of its decisional space.  It 
may announce that the declaration will be fully addressed.  Conversely, it 
may announce that it will not be addressed at all.  It could also announce that 
a declaration of unconstitutionality will be addressed to a certain extent, but 
                                                                                                                   
 242 Mehta, supra note 132, at 112.  
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not fully.  Finally, it can completely ignore the declaration of 
unconstitutionality.  
The second is remedial space, which focuses on the legal mode and the 
substantive means by which a declaration of unconstitutionality will be 
addressed.  In terms of the legal mode of addressing declarations, primary 
legislation passed by Parliament and remedial executive orders under Section 
10 of the HRA comprise the alternatives.243  The substantive means by which 
a declaration of unconstitutionality may be addressed concern the options 
available to Parliament and government in addressing such declarations.  For 
instance, introducing a fresh statutory regime, making changes to the existing 
system, introducing legislative safeguards, or redrawing lines of institutional 
authority are all possible mechanisms for addressing an incompatibility. 
The argument that is developed in this section is that the remedial space 
available to Parliament and government is narrower than which is often 
assumed.  Further, the decisional space is limited not only because it is 
politically difficult to reject declarations of unconstitutionality, but also 
because in practice, courts are mindful of expected political reactions to 
declarations of unconstitutionality.  
B.  Declarations of Unconstitutionality in Practice 
1.  Section 4 of the HRA 
Section 4(2) of the HRA reads: “If the court is satisfied that [a provision 
of primary legislation] . . . is incompatible with a Convention right, it may 
make a declaration of that incompatibility.”244  As stated in Part II, this 
provision empowers certain courts, when satisfied that a provision of primary 
legislation is incompatible with a Convention right, to make a declaration of 
incompatibility (or, as I refer to it, a declaration of unconstitutionality).  The 
decision to make a declaration of unconstitutionality is at the discretion of 
the court,245 and the government is entitled to notice and hearing when the 
court considers making such a declaration.246  A declaration under Section 4 
does not affect the “validity, continuing operation or enforcement” of the 
                                                                                                                   
 243 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 10 (U.K.). 
 244 Id. § 4. 
 245 This discretion is narrow, and courts have rarely found an incompatibility without 
declaring it.  FENWICK, supra note 80, at 200. 
 246 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 5 (U.K.). 
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provision in respect of which it is given.247  It is also not binding on the 
parties to the proceedings in which it is made.248  Sathanapally usefully 
describes it as an “open remedy”––one which leaves it formally open to the 
other branches of government to decide what remedial action to take, if 
any.249 
An examination of the declarations of unconstitutionality that have been 
made thus far reveals many interesting features.  Twenty declarations of 
unconstitutionality were final declarations that were not overturned on 
appeal.250  Eight declarations were overturned at an appellate stage.  
Remarkably, almost all the cases in which declarations of unconstitutionality 
were issued concerned marginalized groups at the fringes of society, 
including patients with mental disorders, illegal immigrants and international 
terrorist suspects.251 
2.  The Impact of Section 4 on the Legislative Process 
It emerges from the case law that two kinds of Section 4 declarations 
have been made by courts.  The first is a declaration that particular statutory 
provisions are incompatible with one or more Convention rights (“specific 
declarations”).  So for example, in what is most commonly known as the 
Belmarsh Prison Case, the House of Lords declared Section 23 of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001252 incompatible with Articles 5253 
and 14254 of the Convention, insofar as it permitted detention of suspected 
international terrorists in a way that was disproportionate and discriminatory 
on the grounds of nationality and immigration status.255  The second category 
                                                                                                                   
 247 Id. § 4(6)(a). 
 248 Id. § 4(6)(b). 
 249 SATHANAPALLY, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
 250 The Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Joint Committee on Human Rights contains a 
mistaken figure.  This is attributable to the fact that the decision in R (Hooper and Others) v. 
Sec’y of State for Work and Pensions, [2002] EWHC 191 (Admin.); [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2623; 
[2005] 1 W.L.R. 1681 is treated as a case in which the declaration of unconstitutionality 
became final.  UK MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
ON THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGMENTS 49 (2012).  As a matter of 
fact, the House of Lords saw “no point” in issuing a declaration of unconstitutionality in that 
case, since the impugned statutory provisions had already been repealed. 
 251 SATHANAPALLY, supra note 2, at 133. 
 252 Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24. 
 253 The right to liberty and security. 
 254 The prohibition of discrimination. 
 255 A v. Secretary of State, [2004] UKHL 56. 
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includes declarations that consider a statutory scheme or regime 
incompatible with Convention rights (“general declarations”).  In 
International Transport Roth, the Court of Appeal declared the penalty 
regime under Part II of the Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999 (which 
penalized unknowing carriers of illegal entrants into the U.K.) incompatible 
with Article 6256 and Article 1 of the First Protocol257 to the Convention.258  
Lord Justice Brown observed that the “troubling features of the scheme” 
were “all inter-linked.”259 
Sathanapally argues that in some cases, declarations of incompatibility 
have been made (in preference over an application of Section 3) in 
conditions where a complex scheme needs to be developed or difficult 
policy-based choices need to be made.260  This, according to her, has been 
done in order to avoid “pre-empting changes to the law through the 
legislative process”261 by identifying standards by which the incompatibility 
may be remedied.  The first part of her argument is correct, and is discernible 
in the case of specific declarations and general declarations.  In fact, both of 
the cases discussed above were followed by comprehensive changes to 
legislative policy.  The detention scheme for suspected international 
terrorists under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, which 
was at issue in the Belmarsh Prison Case,262 was replaced by the “control 
order” regime under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005.263  The penalty 
scheme under the Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999, which was declared 
incompatible in International Transport Roth,264 was replaced by a new 
regime for carriers’ liability under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act, 2002. 
The second part of Sathanapally’s argument––that declarations of 
unconstitutionality in such cases avoid pre-empting changes to the law––is 
on tenuous footing.  In many cases where declarations of unconstitutionality 
are issued, courts nonetheless make obiter dicta suggestions about how 
remedial law on the subject in question might be framed and which legal 
vehicle could be used to bring about that change.  These will be referred to as 
                                                                                                                   
 256 Int’l Transp. Roth GmbH v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 158. 
 257 Id. The right to peaceful enjoyment of property. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at [66]. 
 260 SATHANAPALLY, supra note 2, at 98. 
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 262 A v. Sec’y of State, [2004] UKHL 56. 
 263 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005. 
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“soft suggestions.”  In Clift, the House of Lords was faced with determining 
the compatibility of certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Act, 1991, 
under which the Home Secretary retained the power to determine the release 
on parole of prisoners serving determinate terms of fifteen years or more.265  
Since the parties agreed that a Convention-compatible interpretation would 
not be possible, the Court made a declaration that Sections 46(1) and 50(1) 
of the statute were incompatible with Article 14266 (read with Article 5267).  
Lord Brown observed that, given the Court’s decision, the Home Secretary 
needed to consider whether “the time [had] . . . not now come to leave all 
future decisions as to release on license exclusively to the Parole Board.”268 
Similarly, in T v. Chief Constable, the primary question before the Court 
of Appeal was whether the statutory scheme under the Police Act, 1997, 
which required enhanced criminal record certificates to be issued by the 
Criminal Records Bureau to those working with people under eighteen, was 
compliant with Convention rights.269 The Court found the scheme 
disproportionate and declared it incompatible with Article 8270 of the 
Convention.  The Court’s observations accompanying the declaration of 
unconstitutionality are of particular interest.  It first stated that a 
proportionate scheme that Parliament may seek to introduce would not 
require the individual consideration of every case.271  It then endorsed some 
of the recommendations made by an expert in a recent Criminal Records 
Review on the manner in which offences should be filtered for the purposes 
of disclosure.272  However, the Court stated thereafter that it would not 
“prescribe the solution that should be adopted”273 and that it would be left to 
Parliament to decide “what amendments to make.”274  This disclaimer merely 
reiterates an obvious fundamental principle: if courts prescribed the specific 
remedial course that Parliament should pursue, that would overstep their role 
under the HRA and comprise a usurpation of parliamentary authority.  
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On comparable lines, in Baiai,275 Lord Justice Buxton in the Court of 
Appeal issued guidance of what a Convention-compatible regime for 
controlling sham marriages might look like, after declaring the existing 
regime unconstitutional.276  He observed that: 
[t]o be proportionate, a scheme . . . must either properly 
investigate individual cases, or at least show that it has come 
close to isolating cases that very likely fall into the target 
category.  It must also show that the marriages targeted do 
indeed make substantial inroads into the enforcement of 
immigration control. 277 
The soft suggestions made by courts in these cases have performed one of 
two distinct functions.  In Clift,278 Lord Brown’s statement had the effect of 
acting as a guiding influence on Parliament and government, indirectly 
indicating that any role for the Home Secretary in decisions for release on 
license might face compatibility issues.  In T and Baiai the Court’s 
suggestions operated as assurances that not much needed to be done in order 
to remedy the incompatibility, clarifying the minimum and creating an 
incentive, of sorts, to do so.  In T, it was suggested that an appropriate system 
of filtering could be introduced in the criminal record certificates regime, 
without having to establish a system of individual consideration of every 
case.  In Baiai, the Court of Appeal said that in order to be proportionate, the 
scheme for controlling sham marriages should “at least show that it has come 
close to isolating cases that are very likely to fall into the target category.”279 
In another case before the Court of Appeal, the question was whether 
Sections 72 and 73 of the Mental Health Act, 1983, which impose a “reverse 
burden of proof” on patients applying for discharge from detention in 
hospital, were compatible with the Convention.280  The Court declared 
Sections 72(1) and 73(1) incompatible with Articles 5(1) and 5(4)281 of the 
Convention.282  However, Lord Phillips said that only rarely would “sections 
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72 and 73 constrain a Mental Health Review Tribunal to refuse an order of 
discharge where the continued detention of the patient infringes article 5.”283  
It was a matter which, in the opinion of the Court, the Secretary of State had 
to bear in mind while determining whether to take remedial action under 
Section 10 of the HRA.284  Thus, in this decision, the Court made a subtle 
suggestion about the means that could be employed, in the form of a Section 
10 remedial order, in responding to the declaration of unconstitutionality.  
The unconstitutionality was later removed through a remedial order under 
Section 10 of the HRA.285  Thus, whereas in Clift the Court exerted guiding 
influence on how the unconstitutionality might be addressed, in H, it focused 
on the means by which this might be done. 
A challenge to the argument that has been developed thus far is likely to 
swiftly point to the opinion of Baroness Hale in Wright v. Secretary of State 
for Health.286  Part VII of the Care Standards Act, 2000 established a scheme 
for the creation and maintenance of a statutory list of persons who were 
unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults.287  The relevant question before 
the Court was whether the provisions of Part VII were compatible with the 
Convention rights of care workers.288  After declaring Section 82(4) of the 
Care Standards Act incompatible with Articles 6289 and 8290 of the 
Convention, Baroness Hale observed that she “would not make any attempt 
to suggest ways in which the scheme could be made compatible.”291  She 
provided two reasons for her assertion.  First, the issue involved striking a 
delicate balance between the rights of care workers and the rights of the 
vulnerable people with whom they work and the legislature was in a better 
position to strike this balance.292  Second, the statute in question was likely to 
be replaced by a fresh statutory regime and she did not want her judgment to 
cast light on the incompatibility of that regime.293  Her reasoning does not 
constitute a rejection, in principle, of courts providing subtle suggestions of 
how an incompatibility might be remedied.  Baroness Hale’s decision was 
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grounded in the specific circumstances of the case.  In fact, her decision to 
provide two pointed case-specific reasons for not making such suggestions in 
Wright reflects that she may not have exercised the restraint that she did in 
the absence of those reasons. 
3.  The Nexus Between Declarations of Unconstitutionality and Expected 
Responses 
In a relatively early decision under the HRA, Lord Nicholls confirmed 
that extrinsic evidence extending beyond the statute might need to be relied 
upon in deciding the compatibility of a statutory provision.294  Evidence of 
this kind includes ministerial statements in Parliament, explanatory notes 
published with a statute, and government white papers.295  But extrinsic 
evidence has performed two different functions in the case law.296  The first 
is to decide whether a statutory provision may be incompatible to begin with, 
given its “practical effect” and with regard to the “complete picture” of rights 
protection.297  This would precede the inquiry as to whether the provision 
may be read to be compatible with Section 3 of the HRA.298  The second use 
of extrinsic evidence, which is more interesting in the context of this section, 
is in the choice between the remedial courses under Sections 3 and 4 after an 
incompatibility has been found.299  
Extrinsic evidence from the existing political arena and judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg (the Strasbourg Court) have 
influenced courts’ decisions about whether or not to issue a declaration of 
unconstitutionality.  In Bellinger v. Bellinger, the failure of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1973 to recognize the marriage of a post-operative male to 
female transsexual with a man was at issue before the House of Lords.300  
Given that the Court found the relevant statutory provision incompatible with 
Convention rights,301 it could have either stretched the meanings of the words 
“male” and “female” under the statute so as to include persons who were 
born with one sex but later became or were regarded as persons of the 
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opposite sex, or issued a declaration of unconstitutionality.  In his judgment, 
Lord Nicholls (with whom all the other judges agreed) took account of a 
number of factors in choosing to make a declaration of unconstitutionality.302  
The Strasbourg Court had already determined that the barring of transsexuals 
from marrying in the U.K. was unjustified.303  The Interdepartmental 
Working Group on Transsexual People had been reconvened in the U.K. 
with a mandate to examine the implications of granting full legal status to 
transsexual people.304  The Labour Government had expressed a commitment 
to enact primary legislation allowing transsexuals to marry in such 
situations.305  Finally, a draft outline bill on the issue was to be published in 
due course.306  Lord Nicholls avoided the Section 3 route and made a 
declaration of unconstitutionality using Section 4, on the premise that these 
matters were for Parliament to determine, “especially when the government, 
in unequivocal terms . . . already announced its intention to introduce 
comprehensive primary legislation on this difficult and sensitive subject.”307  
Thus, the Court kept a close eye on the government’s expected response 
while deciding which remedial course to pursue.  
Phillipson criticized the Court’s reliance on the expected legislative 
response when determining whether to issue a declaration of 
unconstitutionality in Bellinger.308  His critique makes three arguments.  
First, that the issue should not have been treated as one to be considered 
either by the Court or by Parliament: both institutions could have played a 
valuable role in the circumstances.  The Court could have re-interpreted the 
section to the benefit of Mrs. Bellinger, and Parliament could have 
introduced a comprehensive legislative scheme thereafter.  Hickman makes a 
similar point, positing that invoking Section 3 would not have precluded 
legislative intervention.309  Second, the Court could not be certain that the 
relevant legislation would in fact be passed.  The proposed legislation could, 
amongst other things, be outweighed by “more pressing business” and the 
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government could always change its mind.310  Third, the new legislation may 
not be retrospective, leaving the litigant in the same position as before.  
These arguments are problematic.  The House of Lords could have chosen 
to re-interpret the relevant statutory provisions in Bellinger.  But exercising 
this option could itself easily have invoked Phillipson’s second concern, as 
immediate judicial redress could have led to the issue being placed on the 
political backburner.  The Court would justifiably have been concerned that 
intervention through Section 3, as opposed to a “headline grabbing”311 
declaration of unconstitutionality, would risk pushing the matter lower down 
on the government’s priority list, as opposed to inviting “prompt 
parliamentary action.”312  This also explains the reason for which the Court 
may have consciously eschewed granting immediate redress to Mrs. 
Bellinger, in the apprehension that this might alleviate the pressure for 
systemic change in the law.  Further, as Kavanagh argues, the decisional 
space available to the government for changing its mind was limited, since 
the government’s intention to bring about legal reform was not a purely 
voluntary decision, but was considered an international law obligation in the 
light of the judgment from Strasbourg.313 
A similar justification partially grounded the House of Lords’ decision to 
make a declaration of unconstitutionality in Anderson.314  The only question 
in that case was whether the Home Secretary’s power to set the tariff for 
mandatory life sentence prisoners was compatible with Article 6315 of the 
Convention.  Mindful of the two recent Strasbourg Court decisions declaring 
the power incompatible316 and evidence from parliamentary debates that 
these decisions would be acted upon,317 the House chose to issue a 
declaration of unconstitutionality. 
R (M) v. Secretary of State for Health,318 illustrates a similar point.  The 
relevant question was whether Sections 26 and 29 of the Mental Health Act, 
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1983, under which a patient could not seek review of the person who was 
appointed as his/her “nearest relative” under the statute, were incompatible 
with Article 8319 of the Convention.320  According to the statutory definition, 
the claimant patient’s allegedly abusive father would have been her nearest 
relative.  The government accepted the incompatibility and through reliance 
upon a number of factors321 seeking to establish its intention to change the 
law, argued that a declaration of unconstitutionality was unnecessary.  
Highlighting that immediate change was not forthcoming and that it would 
be difficult to “predict with accuracy when or how” the incompatibility 
would be rectified, Lord Justice Kay made a declaration of 
unconstitutionality.322  It is instructive to notice from the tenor of the 
judgment of the Administrative Court that the fact that the 
unconstitutionality would, in principle, be remedied was beyond question.  
What motivated the Court to act under Section 4 was, inter alia, that the 
remedy was not immediately forthcoming.  In other words, the Court looked 
upon its declaration as a further catalyst for a remedy that was already in the 
pipeline. 
The argument developed thus far does not necessarily imply that courts 
will issue a declaration of unconstitutionality whenever the government 
seeks one in preference to a Convention-compatible interpretation under 
Section 3 of the HRA.  Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB,323 
provides a good example.  The case concerned the compatibility of the “non-
derogating control order” regime324 under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
2005 with Article 6325 of the Convention.  Finding the regime incompatible, 
the majority chose to interpret the relevant statutory provisions in a 
Convention-compliant manner in spite of the plea of the Secretary of State 
that Section 4 be invoked in preference to Section 3.  As Baroness Hale’s 
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opinion demonstrates, the Court was clearly concerned that a declaration of 
unconstitutionality would not be acted upon.326  It was likely that a finding 
that the regime was non-compliant with Article 6 would prompt the 
government to derogate from that provision of the Convention, thereby 
permitting it to conduct the proceedings in a way that it “knew to be 
incompatible.”327  Thus, the majority chose Section 3 over Section 4 in the 
belief that the government’s remedial preference was not backed by a 
commitment to address the incompatibility with Convention rights. 
Some commentators are troubled by courts’ application of this kind of 
consequentialist reasoning.  According to Jowell, judges should not be 
influenced by the fact that Parliament may disregard their 
pronouncements.328  But this plea is far removed from reality.  Judicial 
consciousness about the aftermath of decisions is so intrinsic to the judicial 
process that if judges are to take criticism for doing so seriously they would 
likely continue to take political reactions into account without actually 
saying that they do so.  As Justice Hogan of the High Court of Ireland argues 
extra-judicially, judges consider it important to be able to have some control 
on the aftermath of their decisions, so as to avoid “social and political chaos” 
and arrive at a consensus fostering a solution that avoids controversy.329  
Judges’ willingness to make findings of unconstitutionality is hampered by 
the possibility that uncontrolled or devastating consequences would follow 
their decisions.  Some prominent theories of judicial decision-making also 
posit that judges take into account the extent to which political actors are 
willing and able to overcome judicial decisions.330  
In the context of the HRA, explanations for making declarations of 
unconstitutionality whose consequences are predictable extend beyond the 
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avoidance of chaos and promotion of consensus building.  Judges could well 
be deeply conscious of preserving the legitimacy and authoritative nature of 
the declaration of unconstitutionality.331  This argument rests on the fear that 
ignorance or rejection of a few declarations of unconstitutionality would 
establish a constitutional precedent.  Another explanation could be that 
judges are anxious for justice to be served to individual litigants in cases 
under the HRA.  Therefore, when a remedy through government is not 
imminent, they would be inclined to invoke Section 3.  However, this 
explanation bears limited application, since legislation addressing 
declarations of unconstitutionality may not be retrospective and does not 
necessarily benefit the litigants in the case.332  In any event, it is discernible 
that courts in the U.K. have made decisions on whether to issue Section 4 
declarations with an eye on expected remedial consequences.  
This argument should not be taken to mean that Parliament is unable to 
reject a judicial invocation of the interpretive obligation under Section 3 of 
the HRA.333  It may do so, for example, by re-enacting the statute in the same 
terms or amending the statutory provision to clarify its meaning.  The 
difference between Section 3 and Section 4 in this regard is that in the case 
of the former, the burden of legislative inertia is on Parliament.334  In other 
words, the government needs to provide the impetus for change through 
Parliament and would have to bear the additional social and political costs 
associated with doing so.  But when a declaration of unconstitutionality is 
made, simply doing nothing is enough to retain the incompatibility on the 
books.335  Other things being equal, it is easier to ignore, or at the least, delay 
responses to, declarations of unconstitutionality than override Convention-
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compatible interpretations under Section 3.336  In both situations, the 
government would need to pay the political price (including the loss of 
public confidence, a breach of international obligations under the Convention 
and the possibility of an adverse ruling from Strasbourg)337 for rejecting the 
court’s understanding of Convention rights.  However, in the case of the 
latter it would need to bear the additional costs accompanying the 
introduction of fresh legislation.  As Perry posits, there is a presumption (in 
the form of the burden of legislative inertia) carrying institutional force in 
favor of the status quo of the law.338  Those seeking to change the law would 
be tasked with overcoming that presumption. 
Further, the parties contending that statutory provisions should be read in 
a Convention compatible manner are certain to benefit from the re-
interpretation of a statutory provision under Section 3, and this benefit is 
unlikely to be withdrawn by subsequent legislation.339  Thus, courts can 
invoke Section 3 in the knowledge that Parliament is virtually powerless, 
even through the enactment of fresh legislation, to deprive benefits conferred 
upon specific parties by the court. 
C.  Responses to Declarations of Unconstitutionality 
1.  The Limited Decisional Space and Remedial Space of Parliament and 
Government 
Judges have been quite conscious in asserting that the consequences of 
declarations of unconstitutionality are political rather than legal.  As Lord 
Scott put it in the Belmarsh Prison Case, the court only draws attention to 
the incompatibility and provides ammunition to people to agitate for change 
through the democratic process.340  In another case, Lord Justice Kay 
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observed that it was for the “the Government to decide what, if anything, to 
do” about a declaration of unconstitutionality.341 
But in practice, Section 4 declarations have been responded to either 
through remedial orders or legislation in almost all cases.  Amongst the 
eighteen declarations that attained finality, twelve were remedied through 
primary legislation.  Amendments were largely made either by introducing 
special legislation or by inserting provisions into a bill that was already 
before Parliament at the time.342  The fast track remedial power under 
Section 10 of the HRA was invoked on three occasions.343  In two cases, the 
impugned provisions had already been amended by primary legislation 
before the filing of the claim.344  One final declaration of unconstitutionality, 
concerning the restrictions on the voting rights of prisoners, is still under 
consideration.345  Even in that case, the government introduced a draft bill for 
pre-legislative scrutiny, in which two out of three options laid out by the 
government seek to purge the incompatibility, while the third restates the 
existing ban.346  Governments have focused more on the imperative question 
of how to act, rather than whether to take any remedial action to begin 
with.347  
Considerable academic debate has developed about whether the 
government has any remedial space in responding to declarations of 
unconstitutionality.  Sathanapally claims that in elongating the response-time 
for legislative response to a declaration and through the strategic technique 
of making minor alterations without fully addressing the declaration, the 
legislature has considerable remedial space in engaging with such 
declarations.348  While conceding that “judicial reasoning leading to a finding 
of incompatibility” will imply that “certain legislative options are 
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precluded,” Kavanagh contends that Parliament will have “room for 
legislative maneuver[ing]” in deciding how to remedy an incompatibility.349  
Neither has considered the extent to which the judicial process does in fact 
narrow the options of Parliament and government.  
Scholars have failed to factor in other important elements that limit the 
remedial space available to the government in responding to declarations of 
unconstitutionality.  To begin with, such declarations are sometimes made in 
respect of a narrow, transitional group of cases where the law has already 
been changed prospectively.  This is what happened in Clift,350 which has 
been discussed above.351  In these situations, the government is deprived of 
the discretion of deciding whether a remedy should be retrospective, since 
the failure to adopt a retrospective remedy would constitute ignorance of the 
declaration and bear attendant political costs.352 
Further, declarations of unconstitutionality are accompanied by soft 
suggestions of how the unconstitutionality might be remedied.  These 
suggestions, as already expounded upon, may perform three distinct 
functions.  First, they may exercise a guiding influence on the government by 
narrowing the government’s substantive options in deciding how to remedy 
the unconstitutionality, limiting its remedial space.  The House of Lords’ 
judgment in Clift353 demonstrated this. 
Second, they may constitute an incentive to remedy the unconstitutional 
provisions, by indicating that only limited change is required to remove the 
unconstitutionality.  Such declarations operate as soft assurances to 
Parliament that an amendment providing a certain floor of rights protection is 
all that is required to comply with the court’s decision.  Here, Parliament is 
not prevented from providing for a higher level of rights protection, but 
would not be required to do so in order to fix the unconstitutionality.  Thus, 
                                                                                                                   
 349 KAVANAGH, supra note 45, at 281.  Similarly, Feldman argues that Parliament retains 
“political freedom” to fashion a response to declarations of unconstitutionality.  David 
Feldman, Lecture at BIICL, London, The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on English 
Public Law, Keynote address at British Institute of International and Comparative Law 
Conference: European Influence on Public Law: 5 Years of the Human Rights Act 1998 in 
English Law and Recent Developments in France (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://www. 
law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/summary/the-impact-of-the-human-rights-act-1998-on-engl 
ish-public-law/2681. 
 350 R (Clift) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] UKHL 54, [2007] 1 A.C. 484. 
 351 See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 352 It should be noted, however, that the associated political costs in such cases might be 
slightly lower than in cases where laws in force are declared unconstitutional, since in these 
situations, the existing law is not incompatible with Convention rights. 
 353 R (Clift) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2006] UKHL 54, [2007] 1 A.C. 484. 
2015]  DECLARATIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY  365 
 
 
remedial space for deciding the level of rights protection that should be 
accorded in order to eliminate the unconstitutionality is attenuated.  This 
claim remains politically untested in one case. A suggestion of this kind 
accompanied Lord Justice Buxton’s declaration of unconstitutionality in the 
Court of Appeal in Baiai.354  However, the declaration of unconstitutionality 
was varied in appeal to the House of Lords.355  But, it was confirmed by 
developments following the Court of Appeal’s judgment in T v Chief 
Constable.356 The Secretary of State amended the statutory provisions 
declared incompatible by an executive instrument,357 based on the 
suggestions of the Court of Appeal that an appropriate filtering mechanism, 
which would not require the individual consideration of every case, could be 
introduced.358 
Third, courts may on some occasions even go to the extent of suggesting 
the means by which a declaration of unconstitutionality may be addressed.  R 
(H) v. London North and East Region Mental Health Review Tribunal359 
provides a good example of this.  The Court of Appeal’s subtle suggestion of 
making a remedial order was acted upon by the Secretary of State. 
These arguments indicate that the remedial space available to the 
Parliament and government varies, both in terms of content and form, and is 
often more limited than one might expect.  It would be going much too far to 
say that Parliament, in Masterman’s words, has “unfettered discretion”360 to 
determine the manner of its response.  These soft suggestions should not be 
mistaken as exerting an insuperable normative force on the government.  
They are obiter dicta statements, but function as conduits through which 
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broader messages are conveyed from the judiciary to Parliament.361  The 
suggestions and a failure to adhere to them, like (but to a lesser extent than) 
the declaration of unconstitutionality, form an important part of the political 
discourse.  In systems of weak-form judicial review, legislative deliberations 
are “informed but not controlled” by what courts have said, since legislatures 
recognize that courts have some advantages over them in constitutional 
interpretation.362  If an adequate proportion of parliamentarians sufficiently 
disagree with the court’s suggestions, they could ignore them in spite of these 
pressures.  
The argument is consistent with the “court-centric” approach to 
ministerial statements of compatibility under Section 19 of the HRA, which 
tend to focus on whether proposed legislation will withstand challenge in 
domestic courts and the Strasbourg Court as opposed to whether such 
legislation is, in the government’s view, compatible with Convention 
rights.363  The Cabinet Office’s “Guide to Making Legislation” also requires 
the relevant government departments to “consider any risk of legal challenge 
and ensure that the way the bill is drafted reduces the risk as far as 
possible.”364  Further, a memorandum setting out the impact of a bill on 
Convention rights, containing a “frank assessment by the department of the 
vulnerability to challenge in legal and policy terms,” is required to be 
provided to the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee before 
the bill can be approved for introduction or publication in draft.365 
2.  The Strasbourg Court Dimension 
One important aspect influencing political responses to declarations of 
unconstitutionality remains to be discussed.  The U.K. was a founding 
member of the Council of Europe, a pan-European organization of forty-
seven member states, and ratified the Convention in 1951.  The Convention 
established the Strasbourg Court, which considers applications concerning 
breaches of provisions of the Convention.366  The U.K. accepted the right of 
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individual petition to the Strasbourg Court in 1966.367  Judgments of the 
Court are binding on the states that are parties to the case.368 
Section 2(1) of the HRA states that courts in the U.K. must take 
Strasbourg Court jurisprudence into account.  Domestic courts in the U.K. 
have adopted the “mirror” principle when considering case law of the 
Strasbourg Court.  According to this principle, which was first articulated in 
Alconbury369 and has been cited in several cases thereafter,370 a strong 
presumption that clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence will be 
followed operates.  This presumption can be displaced only for very good 
reasons;371 for instance, if the Strasbourg decision is “fundamentally at odds 
with the distribution of powers under the British constitution”372 or 
misunderstands some aspect of English law.373 
The transformation of Convention rights into domestic law is meant to 
function as a floor rather than a ceiling.  Although domestic courts can 
provide augmented rights protection, they cannot fall below the minimum 
standard set by Strasbourg.374  As Lord Bingham famously put it, the national 
courts would “keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over 
time: no more, but certainly no less.”375 
The failure to address a domestic declaration of unconstitutionality could 
result in a case being taken to the Strasbourg Court, with a high probability 
that the court would find a breach of Convention rights.376  This because 
Strasbourg Court accords a margin of appreciation to decisions of national 
authorities, including courts.  Thus, the political sanction underlying a 
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declaration of unconstitutionality transforms into a legal sanction through the 
Strasbourg Court.377  The U.K. then falls under an international obligation to 
amend its domestic law. 
3.  A Constitutional Convention or Atrophy of Constitutional Power 
Jennings provided a now familiar three-part test for establishing that a 
practice had transformed into a constitutional convention.  There are three 
necessary conditions for a constitutional convention to develop: The 
existence of a precedent, belief on the part of political actors that they are 
bound by the precedent, and a reason for the rule.378  Jaconelli added a self-
evident, but sometimes overlooked, fourth condition: that the rule must be 
constitutional in character (i.e., it must “regulate the manner in which the 
business of government is to be conducted”).379  Has the expectation that the 
Parliament or government of the day will address declarations of 
unconstitutionality transformed into a constitutional convention?  Many 
people believe that a convention to this effect is emerging, but has not yet 
fully crystallized.380  The Strasbourg Court adopted a similar position in 
Burden v. United Kingdom.381  Although there is no legal obligation to 
address declarations of unconstitutionality, the Court observed that it was 
possible that in the future, evidence of a “long-standing and established 
practice” of giving effect to declarations of unconstitutionality “might be 
sufficient to persuade [it] . . . of the effectiveness of the procedure.”382  The 
implication is that while the practice has a constitutional character and is 
supported by underlying reasons (varying from the special status of courts in 
determining the meaning of Convention rights to the protection of 
minorities), sufficient precedent is not yet available, and the beliefs of 
political actors on the binding nature of this expectation are not firmly 
developed.  
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Vermeule argues that some constitutional powers tend to “atrophy” over 
time.383  Powers that remain unexercised for long periods gradually become 
un-exercisable, as their exercise would seem to run contrary to the rules of 
the political game.  Another way of looking at this argument is that on 
account of political precedent heuristics, a constitutional convention against 
the use of such powers develops as the power falls into desuetude.  In the 
context of the declaration of unconstitutionality, Vermeule argues that 
Parliament’s compliance may “unintentionally be preparing the ground for a 
day in which Parliament will be thought to violate a constitutional 
convention if it refuses to comply.”384  
Vermeule provides the following examples to demonstrate his argument: 
the royal veto in the U.K., the “notwithstanding” clause under Section 33 of 
the Canadian Charter, the “disallowance” power (also of Canadian heritage), 
the power to “pack” the Supreme Court and the Congressional power to 
impeach executive officers (both from the United States).385  It is not merely 
coincidental that all his examples of atrophy refer to powers where the 
burden of legislative inertia is on the body that seeks to exercise its 
constitutional power.  For instance, in order to invoke the “notwithstanding” 
clause under Section 33 of the Canadian Charter, the relevant legislature 
needs to do so expressly through statute.  Similarly, to pursue a “court-
packing” agenda, the U.S. Congress would have to assemble the political 
capital to pass appropriate legislation.  In these examples, the position after 
the power has atrophied is the default case.  As explored previously, the 
declaration of unconstitutionality is subtly different. Under the HRA, the 
default case is that primary legislation remains valid unless the government 
or Parliament addresses the declaration that it is incompatible with 
Convention rights.386  
Evaluating the atrophy of powers where the burden of legislative inertia is 
on the legislature or government is fairly straightforward and can be 
expressed in terms of a binary.  In the case of the notwithstanding clause and 
the court-packing power, we can say that required legislation has either been 
enacted or it hasn’t.  The prisoner voting rights story following the 
declaration of unconstitutionality in Smith v. Scott387 demonstrates that this is 
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not quite as easy to discern with the declaration of unconstitutionality.  Six 
years after the Scottish Registration Appellate Court declared Section 3 of 
the Representation of People Act, 1983 incompatible with Article 3 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention388 (providing for “free and fair elections and 
the right to free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature”), 
this incompatibility remains legal authority.  In some official statements, 
governments have expressed an intention to remove the incompatibility.389  
But individuals in government, including the Prime Minister,390 have 
expressed strong disagreement with the decision.  How is such a case to be 
considered in the context of a constitutional convention or atrophy analysis?  
If we were to argue that only express rejection of a declaration of 
unconstitutionality constitutes a refusal to comply, then this would be treated 
as compliance.  On the other hand, the incompatible law still remains the law 
of the land.  The evaluation of compliance with declarations of 
unconstitutionality is not conducive to a binary analysis, but fits more 
comfortably with the idea of a gradient, requiring a nuanced approach. 
It may, of course, be possible for such strong constitutional practice to 
develop that the government or Parliament will be expected to address all 
declarations of unconstitutionality.  The important point is that by virtue of 
the structural design of the HRA, the crystallization of a constitutional 
convention that declarations under Section 4 will be addressed is likely to be 
a slower and more arduous process than it would be for powers where the 
burden of legislative inertia is on the body possessing the power.  
V.  A COMPARISON OF THE SPACE AVAILABLE FOR POLITICAL RESPONSES 
This section seeks to construct an overview drawing upon the arguments 
made in preceding sections.  It will integrate Part III, which focused on 
responses to declarations of unconstitutionality in India, with Part IV, which 
engaged with arguments concerning the space available to political actors in 
responding to declarations of unconstitutionality in the U.K.  Part IV 
demonstrated the distinction between two kinds of space available in 
responding to declarations of unconstitutionality—decisional space and 
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remedial space.  This section will draw upon the two concepts of space in the 
context of both India and the U.K.  
A.  Comparing Decisional Space in India and the U.K. 
What is the difference between the U.K. Parliament and government’s 
capacity to reject declarations of unconstitutionality compared with that of 
the Indian Parliament and government?  At the outset, it is worth flagging up 
the distinction between the structural design of the HRA and the Indian 
Constitution.  The former, as examined in Part IV, places the burden of 
inertia on the person seeking to remove the unconstitutionality.  In other 
words, a declaration of unconstitutionality does not automatically result in a 
change of the law—it still requires remedial action (in the form of a remedial 
order or legislative change) in order for the application of the law to be 
affected in any way.  As long as Parliament and the government choose not 
to act, the expectation is that the law will continue to be enforced as it was 
before the declaration of unconstitutionality was made.  In India, the burden 
of inertia is on Parliament and the government, since a declaration of 
unconstitutionality automatically results in the disapplication and non-
enforcement of the law.  Political capital in the form of a two-thirds majority 
in Parliament needs to be assembled before fundamental rights amendments 
or Ninth Schedule amendments can be made in order to nullify an Indian 
court’s judgment.  
The decisional space available in the U.K. is less than that assumed in the 
existing literature.  This is for a number of reasons.  First, the government’s 
record of consistently addressing declarations of unconstitutionality is not 
simply about “inductive reliance on a given pattern of behavior,”391 it is often 
the result of calculated attempts by the court to issue such declarations in 
conditions favorable to change.  In many cases, courts issue declarations of 
unconstitutionality knowing that there is either an intention to amend the law 
in any event, or a strong likelihood that the law will be amended if the 
declaration of unconstitutionality is issued.  This makes the “decisional 
space” question hollow, since the Parliament or government do not harbor a 
desire to reject the declaration of unconstitutionality to begin with.  Further, 
the failure to address a declaration of unconstitutionality (even when 
Parliament wishes to reject it) is likely to result in an adverse ruling from the 
Strasbourg Court, placing the government in breach of its international 
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obligations.  Finally, soft suggestions made by courts indicating that only 
minimal change is required in order to address the unconstitutionality 
influence the decisional space available to Parliament and government. 
Conversely, the decisional space available to the Indian Parliament and 
government when primary legislation is declared unconstitutional for 
violating fundamental rights is wider than that which is ascribed to them by 
the existing scholarship.  Parliament has two methods of responding to 
declarations of unconstitutionality: fundamental rights amendments and 
Ninth Schedule amendments.  Whether the judgments in the Basic Structure 
Case and Coelho have circumscribed these response mechanisms to such an 
extent that they are rendered un-exercisable or virtually un-exercisable has 
remained controversial.  In Part III, I argued, based on an analysis of these 
two judgments as well as other decisions of the Supreme Court, that 
Parliament still retains some amount of space to respond to judgments 
through these two response mechanisms. 
Whereas the U.K. Parliament and government has less space for response 
than that often assumed, its Indian counterparts have greater space for 
response than that attributed by scholars after the Basic Structure and Coelho 
judgments.  The decisional space for responding to judgments in both 
jurisdictions is difficult to match with surgical precision.  But the argument 
that I am making is that the decisional space available in India and the U.K. 
is comparable, and provides for a much closer similarity than a bare 
juxtaposition of the literature in both jurisdictions seems to suggest.  What 
becomes lucid from an analysis of both jurisdictions is that in India and the 
U.K. pronounced disagreement by some (or even a majority of) political 
representatives with a judgment striking down legislation or invoking 
Section 4 of the HRA has not proven sufficient to reject the judgment.  The 
political fallout from the Belmarsh Prison judgment exemplifies this.  That 
judgment392 declared a part of the U.K.’s erstwhile anti-terrorism law 
unconstitutional and was initially opposed by sections of the government and 
parliament; but nevertheless the decision eventually led to a repeal of the law 
and its replacement by a fresh anti-terrorism regime.393  
In India and the U.K., extraordinary impetus is required in order to reject 
declarations of unconstitutionality.  The hurdles that need to be overcome by 
this impetus are distinct in both jurisdictions.  In the U.K., these hurdles 
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include public and political pressure when a declaration of 
unconstitutionality is made and the risk of a finding from the Strasbourg 
Court that the government is in breach of its international obligations.  In 
India, the biggest hurdle is the fact that these response mechanisms can only 
be invoked through a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament.  Unless the 
ruling government has a particularly strong parliamentary mandate, this 
would necessitate considerable support cutting across political party lines.  
The other hurdle that governments in India would be tasked with overcoming 
is the pressure of public opinion, particularly given the surge in the 
institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court and High Courts in the last 
three decades.394 
But these arguments should not be taken so far as to say that parliament 
and government in India and the U.K. have virtually no decisional space.  It 
is not inconceivable to think of situations where parliaments in both 
jurisdictions gather the impetus to reject a judgment declaring that primary 
legislation which is a political “hot potato” or high on the political agenda is 
unconstitutional.  There is ample evidence in support of this claim with 
regard to the property cases in India.  Since agrarian reform was a 
cornerstone of the political agenda post-independence, several judgments 
(many of which were discussed in Part III) declaring land redistribution 
legislation unconstitutional were nullified through fundamental rights 
amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments.  In the U.K., the 
developments surrounding the declaration of unconstitutionality issued in 
Smith v. Scott395 concerning the restrictions on prisoners’ right to vote 
(considered in Part IV) provides a good example.  The draft bill396 introduced 
by the government for pre-legislative scrutiny contemplates rejecting the 
declaration outright, since one of the three options set out in the bill presents 
this possibility.  It waits to be seen whether and how the government chooses 
to address the incompatibility.  But the side to which the scales eventually tip 
does not significantly affect my argument.  Even if Parliament chooses to 
address the unconstitutionality, the aftermath of the case would demonstrate 
that the impetus for rejecting the declaration, although considerable, was not 
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eventually sufficient to overcome the hurdles faced by Parliament and 
government.  
B.  Remedial Space in India and the U.K.: The Room for Maneuver 
A comparison of the remedial space available in India and the U.K. is 
slightly more complicated.  Once again, an important difference between the 
HRA and the Indian Constitution bears on the manner in which remedial 
space should be understood in these jurisdictions.  In the U.K., remedial 
space has been referred to as the legal mode (a remedial order under Section 
10 of the HRA or fresh primary legislation) and substantive means (the 
replacement of an entire regime, minor changes to the existing legislation, 
etc.) available for addressing declarations of unconstitutionality.  In other 
words, it refers to the room for legislative maneuver after Parliament or the 
government has decided to address the declaration of unconstitutionality in 
some way (rather than to simply ignore it or reject it outright).  In the Indian 
context, I will refer to remedial space as the legal mode (fundamental rights 
amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments), and substantive means 
available to Parliament and government in responding to declarations of 
unconstitutionality.  This refers to the room for maneuver available to the 
Indian Parliament and government once they have decided to respond to a 
declaration of unconstitutionality. 
At first glance, this seems a comparison between unequals in the sense 
that it is implausible to compare responses to declarations of 
unconstitutionality that seek to comply with human rights decisions of courts 
in the U.K. with responses to declarations of unconstitutionality in India, 
which detract from (rather than advance) judicial decisions striking down 
legislation.  But such criticism fails to appreciate the nuances of what 
actually takes place when a declaration of unconstitutionality is made.  In the 
U.K., although the remedial order or legislation for addressing a declaration 
of unconstitutionality seeks to put the court’s judgment into effect, it may 
also provide the opportunity for Parliament and the government to calibrate 
its response to the court’s judgment by addressing the unconstitutionality in a 
way that doesn’t fully give effect to the judgment or does so in a limited 
way.397  Westminster Parliament’s response to the declarations of 
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unconstitutionality made in Morris and Gabaj,398 which declared Section 
185(4) of the Housing Act, 1996 incompatible with the anti-discrimination 
provision under Article 14 of the Convention, provides an example.  In spite 
of the remedial law amending the incompatible statutory provision, by 
retaining elements of discrimination in the social housing regime, the 
government was seen as not fully complying with the two judgments.399  
Thus, in practice, remedial orders or legislation act both as a way of 
complying with and as a mode of sidestepping or detracting from the court’s 
judgment.  
In India, Parliament has employed two response mechanisms to respond 
to declarations of unconstitutionality: fundamental rights amendments and 
Ninth Schedule amendments.  As expounded in Part III, both of these 
response mechanisms can be subjected to judicial review, but the test for 
reviewing them varies.  While fundamental rights amendments are subjected 
to the “essence of rights test,” Ninth Schedule amendments are subjected to 
the “rights test.”400  In being able to select which of these response 
mechanisms to invoke when a judgment declares primary legislation 
unconstitutional, Parliament is also in a position to decide which test for 
review should be applicable to its response.  It would, of course, be likely to 
choose the test that is expected to withstand subsequent challenge in court.  
Parliament may also, as it has done in the past,401 invoke both response 
mechanisms in conjunction.  
Another important factor strategically influences the Indian Parliament’s 
choice between these two response mechanisms.  By definition, the Ninth 
Schedule insulates statutes from judicial review and thus has an impact 
exclusively vis-à-vis the law that is protected through a Ninth Schedule 
amendment.402  Fundamental rights amendments, on the other hand, have 
broader implications on the constitutional landscape.  In the process of 
nullifying judgments through a fundamental rights amendment, Parliament 
also risks having an impact on other statutes and transactions affected by the 
amendment.403  In this sense, Ninth Schedule amendments are more narrowly 
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targeted and their consequences are more foreseeable than fundamental 
rights amendments. 
Thus, Parliament has room for maneuver in choosing between these two 
response mechanisms, particularly bearing in mind the different tests of 
judicial review that apply to them and the differences in the influence of the 
response mechanisms on the constitutional system as a whole. 
But the substantive options before the Indian Parliament in responding to 
declarations of unconstitutionality are limited.  Ninth Schedule amendments 
are not particularly conducive to making measured responses to judgments 
declaring legislation unconstitutional.  This is on account of the fact that 
Article 31B of the Indian Constitution is not based on any underlying legal 
logic404 applicable to the nullified judgment: it simply removes the 
substratum of the judgment by reviving a previously invalidated statute from 
judicial review for violating fundamental rights.  In practice, it has 
represented an “all or nothing” tool, presenting the government with the 
binary choice of either accepting a judicial decision striking down legislation 
or rejecting it altogether by inserting the whole statute into the Ninth 
Schedule (that is, if it has the political capability of securing the passage of a 
constitutional amendment in Parliament).  This is what happened, for 
example, in Balmadies Plantations v. State of Tamil Nadu405 (discussed in 
Part II), where the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a few provisions of the 
Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 
1969 led to the insertion of the statute in toto into the Ninth Schedule.  This 
nullified the effect of the Supreme Court judgment in its entirety.  The 
second response mechanism, fundamental rights amendments, has 
represented a similarly blunt tool.  Since such amendments pull the rug from 
under the court’s judgment by altering the fundamental right on which it was 
based, they have also tended to assume the form of absolute reversals of 
declarations of unconstitutionality.406  The First Amendment to the 
                                                                                                                   
 404 There are of course shades of political logic that, it may be argued, apply to Article 31B. 
For example, when Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule were being debated in the Provisional 
Parliament, Jawaharlal Nehru argued that it was a safety valve against the colonial mindset of 
courts which distrusted the capacity of Indians to govern themselves.  Arudra Burra, 
Arguments from Colonial Continuity: The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, 5–6, 8 
(2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =2052659. 
 405 The Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974. 
 406 In theory, it would sometimes be possible for Parliament to meet courts halfway using 
the two response mechanisms described.  For instance, Parliament may only insert some (and 
not all) of the statutory provisions declared unconstitutional into the Ninth Schedule.  
Similarly, if different provisions of a statute are struck down for violating different 
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Constitution, through which the constitutionally permissible restrictions on 
the freedom of speech were expanded in order to revive a statutory 
provision407 invalidated by the Patna High Court in Shaila Bala Devi v. Chief 
Secretary,408 is an example.409  
Thus, governments in both the U.K. and India have remedial space in 
deciding how to respond to declarations of unconstitutionality (whether 
through remedial orders or legislation in the U.K. and fundamental rights 
amendments or Ninth Schedule amendments in India).  In the U.K., this 
remedial space may be subject to the guiding influence of the court’s opinion 
about which remedial measure should be employed to address the 
unconstitutionality.  With regard to the substantive options available to the 
Parliament and government, the menu of possibilities available to respond to 
a declaration of unconstitutionality in the U.K. is wide but may be partly 
narrowed by the soft suggestions made by the court in its decision.  In India, 
on the other hand, the options for responding to a declaration of 
unconstitutionality are more limited in the sense that both fundamental rights 
amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments tend to eliminate the 
substratum of judgments altogether, either restoring the statute in question to 
the state that it was in before the court’s judgment or paving the way for the 
fresh enactment of an identical or substantially similar statute. 
C.  The Capacity to Respond: The Constitutional Convention Question 
The question about whether the ability to reject declarations of 
unconstitutionality has atrophied or has been politically neutralized through a 
constitutional convention arises in both jurisdictions.  In the U.K., this claim 
is based on the fact that no declaration of unconstitutionality has been 
rejected outright in the fourteen years since the HRA came into effect.  In 
Part IV, I cautioned against concluding that a constitutional convention 
against the power to reject declarations of unconstitutionality has developed 
based on two reasons.  First, the declaration of unconstitutionality is subtly 
different from many other constitutional remedies in that it places the burden 
                                                                                                                   
fundamental rights, only one of the fundamental rights may be amended so as to preserve the 
specific statutory provisions which violated it.  But calibrated responses of this kind have not 
been seen in practice and, as these hypothetical examples bear out, are contingent on several 
factors. 
 407 The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, § 4(1)(a). 
 408 A.I.R. 1951 (Pat.) 12. 
 409 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. 
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of inertia on the person seeking to remove the unconstitutionality.  Second, 
evaluating the atrophy of power is more complex in a structure where the 
burden of inertia is not on the Parliament or government.  Thus, a much 
longer timeframe is required in order to establish that the power to reject a 
declaration of unconstitutionality has atrophied. 
In India, the atrophy analysis may be premised on the basis that the last 
fundamental right amendment and Ninth Schedule amendment entered into 
force in 1972410 and 1990411 respectively.412  Does the non-use of these 
powers for over two decades imply that they have been rendered extinct by 
constitutional convention?  It would be a misconception to arrive at this 
conclusion.  As expounded upon in Part III, as recently as 2007, Sabharwal 
CJ, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court in Coelho, was awake to the 
possibility of the Ninth Schedule being employed as a response mechanism 
to nullify declarations of unconstitutionality.413  
There is a complex web of reasons explaining why the Indian Parliament 
has not employed fundamental rights amendments and Ninth Schedule 
amendments in recent years.  These include the following.  First, a large 
amount of controversial government policy has been implemented through 
delegated legislation.414  This has sometimes resulted in judgments striking 
down such delegated legislation and subsequent constitutional amendments 
to nullify the effects of these judgments.415  Second, no single political party 
secured an absolute majority in the Lower House of Parliament between 
1989 and 2014, necessitating rule by coalition governments composed of a 
                                                                                                                   
 410 The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971. 
 411 The Constitution (Sixty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1990. 
 412 This should not be confused with the invocation of the Ninth Schedule and the power to 
amend the Constitution in general.  These two powers have been invoked thereafter as well, so 
the question of their atrophy does not arise.  The plausible atrophy argument relates to the 
distinctive use of these powers to nullify declarations holding legislation unconstitutional for 
violating fundamental rights.  My response is to this discrete argument. 
 413 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 861 [78]. 
 414 This has been partially caused by the increase in the plenary bottlenecks in Parliament 
(which I have addressed below).  P. Rajeev, Parliamentary Supremacy Under Attack, THE 
HINDU, Aug. 7, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/parliamentary-supremacy-under-
attack/article4996588.ece. 
 415 See, for example, the Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2001 (which nullified 
the effects of Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 448 and Ajit Singh v. 
State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1189).  The Constitution (Seventy-sixth Amendment) Act, 
1994, the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995; the Constitution (Eighty-
first Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Constitution (Eighty-second Amendment) Act, 2000 
nullified some of the effects of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477. 
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number of political parties.416  In many cases, more than eight political 
parties have formed part of a ruling coalition government.417  This has made 
mobilizing the two-thirds majority required in order to pass fundamental 
rights amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments politically difficult (but 
not impossible, since other constitutional amendments have been passed 
between 1989 and 2014).  There is no reason to believe that responses to 
judgments striking down legislation for violating fundamental rights through 
these mechanisms would not see resurgence if a single party gains 
ascendancy in Parliament,418 as the Bhartiya Janata Party has in the general 
elections of 2014.  Third, the increase in the Supreme Court’s perceived 
institutional legitimacy has made it more difficult for governments to justify 
nullifying courts’ decisions.  As Baxi famously put it, by relaxing rules of 
standing and opening its doors to the destitute and oppressed, the Supreme 
Court began to transform itself from the “Supreme Court of India” to the 
“Supreme Court for Indians” in the 1980s.419  Almost simultaneously, 
Parliament’s reputation saw a general decline.420  Fourth, recent years have 
seen an increase in plenary bottlenecks due to obstructionism in 
Parliament.421  This has resulted in an overall decrease in Parliament’s 
plenary time and legislative output,422 giving it a smaller window of 
opportunity to consider matters beyond its most pressing business. 
Thus, the argument that the power to reject declarations of 
unconstitutionality has atrophied in both jurisdictions is mistaken.  
                                                                                                                   
 416 Since the Lower House of Parliament follows the “first past the post” electoral system, an 
absolute majority of seats in the House does not necessarily translate into a majority of the 
total number of votes cast. 
 417 The United Front government under H.D. Deve Gowda (1996–1997), the United Front 
government under I.K. Gujral (1997) and the National Democratic Alliance government under 
A. B. Vajpayee (1999–2004) are examples. 
 418 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, India’s Judiciary: The Promise of Uncertainty, in THE SUPREME 
COURT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION 163 (Pran Chopra ed., 2006). 
 419 Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court 
of India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107 (1985). 
 420 Devesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Indian Parliament as an Institution of 
Accountability, UNRISD Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper No. 
23, 16 (2006). 
 421 Tarunabh Khaitan, The Real Price of Parliamentary Obstruction, 642 SEMINAR 37 (2013). 
 422 The statistics published by PRS Legislative Research reflecting the amount of time lost 
due to obstruction in Parliament can be accessed here: Vital Stats: Participation of Lok Sabha 
MPs in Budget Session 2014, PRS LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (July 30, 2013, 9:30 AM), http:// 
www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/vital-stats/; see also Kapur & Mehta, supra note 420, at 16. 
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Responding to such judgments in India and the U.K. remains a political 
option, albeit one which is difficult to exercise.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has compared the space for political responses to declarations 
of unconstitutionality in India and the U.K.  Part II provided the 
constitutional context to declarations of unconstitutionality in these 
jurisdictions.  I argued that the declaration of unconstitutionality is, formally 
speaking, triggered earlier in India than in the U.K.  In other words, ceteris 
paribus, there would (hypothetically speaking) be identical cases in which a 
declaration of unconstitutionality is made in India, but in which Section 3 of 
the HRA is invoked in the U.K. in preference to Section 4.  
In both jurisdictions, after the declaration of unconstitutionality is made 
comes the question of what, if anything, the parliament and government 
should do about it.  The possibility of an atrophy of the power to reject a 
declaration of unconstitutionality arises in both nations because of the 
infrequency of such rejections.  But the atrophy argument is misguided in the 
context of the Indian and U.K. constitutions, although the reasons for which 
it is so misguided vary.  
The decisional space available to parliament and government in both 
jurisdictions is similar.  The academic literature in the U.K. fails to account 
for some factors that operate as limits on decisional space.  In India, the 
decisional space is underestimated largely owing to a misreading of 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.  After making these 
adjustments to the decisional space in India and the U.K., the positions in 
both jurisdictions are not as divergent as they might have appeared initially. 
Moving to remedial space, India and the U.K. also share a similar level of 
flexibility in the form of their responses to declarations of 
unconstitutionality.  In India, Parliament can select whether to respond 
through fundamental rights amendments or Ninth Schedule amendments (or 
both).  In making this choice, it also makes an implicit selection of the test of 
review its response would be subjected to in a potential challenge in court.  
Its choice may also be influenced by the difference in the nature and scope of 
these response mechanisms.  In the U.K., Parliament and government’s 
choice lies in deciding between a fast track remedial order and primary 
legislation.  Obiter dictum judicial statements about the means that should be 
employed to address an incompatibility may influence their choice. 
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The only area in which the two nations drift away from one another 
concerns the second part of remedial space––the substantive options 
available in responding to a declaration of unconstitutionality.  Parliament 
and government in the U.K. have the flexibility to make nuanced responses 
to declarations under Section 4 of the HRA.  This flexibility is restricted to 
some extent by the scope of the declaration itself and the guiding influence 
of the judgment that makes it.  In India, on the other hand, fundamental 
rights amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments have resembled blunt 
tools to respond to declarations of unconstitutionality, since their invocation 
normally results in the complete nullification of the judgment striking down 
legislation through the revival of statutes in toto.    
This Article has sought to answer many questions—but it has wider 
implications that give rise to further constitutional questions.  Parliamentary 
sovereignty remains an omnipresent influence under the HRA, whereas to 
many, the Indian system is characterized by judicial supremacy.  The default 
position after a declaration of unconstitutionality is made differs in both 
jurisdictions.  In the U.K., the law stands until Parliament does something 
about it; in India, the law does not stand unless Parliament does something 
about it.  The Indian landscape resembles what many people have in mind 
when they describe a strong form system of judicial review.  Conversely, the 
HRA is frequently cited as the exemplar of weak form judicial review.  In 
spite of these differences, the space for political actors to respond to 
declarations of unconstitutionality in the two jurisdictions is not dissimilar.  
What does this tell us about the nature of the two constitutions?  Could it be 
that variations in constitutional framework and design do not significantly 
impact political behavior, or are the variations themselves more a matter of 
perception rather than substance?423  These questions deserve exploration on 
a separate occasion.  For the time being, suffice it to say that in spite of the 
differences in the constitutional structure and culture of the two jurisdictions, 
political actors in India and the U.K. enjoy substantially similar elbow room 
in responding to declarations of unconstitutionality.  
                                                                                                                   
 423  This Article leans towards the view that the dichotomies between strong form and weak 
form judicial review, and parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, demand dilution, 
if not reconsideration.  The extent to which my argument supports this hypothesis, however, 
undoubtedly requires deeper consideration.  
       
